16.1 |
The welfare of Service Personnel
for
procurement in 2011). The MOD was considering “innovative finance
arrangements”,
including
leasing arrangements.
58.
Gen
Granville-Chapman provided Gen Walker with an update on the
stocktake on
6 January
2006.44
After
further work, the early acquisition of a fifth C-17 remained
a
possibility.
The “less good news” was that the Treasury now contended that
fitting the
additional
TriStar with DAS was not a legitimate charge to the Reserve, given
that the
“hub and
spoke” arrangement using Al Udied was now operational. Officials
advised that
the MOD
should continue fitting DAS “at risks”.
59.
In his
post-operational tour report on 18 January, Major General James
Dutton,
General
Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East),
wrote:
“The
reliance on only 3 suitably equipped TriStar C-2 aircraft to
support the UK-BAS
[Basra Air
Station] air bridge task has again created significant problems,
especially
as one
aircraft has been in long term major maintenance for most of the
period and
the others
have occasionally been required for Op HERRICK tasks …
consequently
there is an
indisputable need for additional Defensive Aids Suite (DAS)
equipment
for air
transport assets.”45
60.
Gen Walker
directed on 24 January that the MOD should “explore
innovative
funding
operations for the early procurement of a fifth C-17
aircraft”.46
61.
In April 2006,
the MOD’s Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC)
published
its third
report of Op TELIC lessons, covering the period from 1 December
2004 to
28 February
2006.47
The report
is described in detail in Section 14.1.
62.
On AT, the DOC
reported:
“The
availability of air transport assets became critical in October
2005. The strategic
and
tactical requirement for all aircraft to be equipped with Defensive
Aids Suite
(DAS) in
theatre has compounded the problem. The air bridge to theatre
became so
fragile
that the Rest and Recuperation (R&R) plot became close to
untenable in Oct/
Nov 2005 …
This affected morale and the operational effectiveness of the
British
personnel
in MND(SE). The situation became so pronounced that HQ LAND
was
tasked to
look at initiatives that would allow a shortened tour length
without R&R …
the Op
HERRICK deployment [to Helmand province, Afghanistan] brings with
it more
pain rather
than respite and, as a result, the imperative to improve our AT
capacity is
stronger
than ever.”
44
Minute VCDS
to CDS, 6 January 2006, ‘Air Transport Support to
Operations’.
45
Report HQ
MND(SE) to PJHQ – J3, 18 January 2006, ‘Progress Report – Operation
TELIC’.
46
Minutes, 24
January 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
47
Report DOC,
4 April 2006, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume
3’.
13