6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
1251.
Mr Bowen
suggested that officials should show the draft paper to their
Ministers,
if they had
not already done so: “We will then see the outcome of the Prime
Ministerial
visit to
Camp David and consider formal submission early next
week.”
1252.
There is no
indication whether the objectives were ever adopted
formally.
1253.
Officials
expressed concern about the absence of an Iraqi perspective in
UK
and
Coalition planning.
1254.
Mr Lee
expressed concern to MOD colleagues about the apparent absence
of
any Iraqi
perspective in the objective-setting process:
“I get no
sense in anything we’re doing of an Iraqi input. (State Dept in
Washington
have had a
large ‘Future of Iraq’ project going for some time addressing
exactly this
point – but
it seems to have dropped off the table).”528
1255.
Dr Robert
Wilson, an FCO Research Analyst, commented on the failure
to
engage with
Iraqis as the invasion began in a minute to Mr Chilcott on 27
March:
“A point
that is being made with increasing force by members of the Iraqi
community
is that the
Coalition is failing to engage them in the process of their
liberation …
“Several
people have made the point to me that we need to get Iraqis
visibly
involved on
the side of the Coalition, and in whatever way is possible
establish a
sense of
partnership between the Coalition and the Iraqi population. If we
do not do
so, we may
find that we are dealing not with a jubilant population but one
that says,
‘OK, you’ve
got rid of Saddam. Now what?’ …
“The sense
of a lack of partnership is unfortunately strengthened by our own
focus
on the
humanitarian side – handing out food, bringing in ‘aid’. Iraqis are
proud and
don’t feel
they need aid or handouts …”529
1256.
The Inquiry
has seen no response either to Mr Lee or to Dr
Wilson.
1257.
The first
detailed military planning papers for Phase IV were
presented
to the
Chiefs of Staff on 25 March.
1258.
On 25 March,
Mr Watkins reported to No.10 that: “Southern Iraq is
effectively
under
Coalition control although significant resistance remains in
Basra.”530
1259.
The same day,
Lt Gen Reith presented the Chiefs of Staff with a draft
Operational
Concept and
draft planning guidance for Phase IV.
528
Minute Lee
to Policy Director, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Camp David
Meeting’.
529
Minute
Wilson to Chilcott, 27 March 2003, ‘Failure to Engage with the
Iraqis’.
530
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to
Washington. Iraq: Review of the
Military
Situation’.
533