3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
687.
Mr Blair
reiterated his arguments that the world had to take a stand to
disarm Iraq
so as to
send a message to other countries that were potentially developing
weapons
of mass
destruction that they had to take the international community
seriously. Delay
would make
it more difficult to deal with the issue: in his view it was “only
a matter of
time before
international terrorism and these types of weapons come
together”.
688.
Asked what was
the most important item on the agenda for his meeting
with
President
Bush, Mr Blair replied:
“To agree
the right strategy for the future and to … explain … yet again why
it is
important
to deal with this issue.”
689.
Mr Blair
concluded in relation to Iraq that:
“… when
America is taking on these tough and difficult questions our job is
to be
there. Not
be there at any price, not be there without saying how we think the
thing
should be
dealt with, but being there in the difficult and tricky times, not
simply …
as fair
weather friends.”
690.
Mr Scarlett
and SIS1 provided material for use during the interview. This
is
addressed
in Section 4.3.
691.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that the UK problem was that President
Bush
“seemed
hell‑bent on war and we looked like we were doing things from a US
not
692.
Mr Campbell
added on 27 January: “Despite yesterday people were still
applying
the
yardstick that the inspectors would have to find WMD rather than
simply that
Saddam had
to co‑operate.”239
693.
Mr Vladimir
Putin, the Russian President, told Mr Blair on 27 January
that
inspections
needed more time.
694.
President
Putin contacted Mr Blair on 27 January to discuss the
differences in
the
international community’s approach to North Korea and
Iraq.240
On the
former, the
strategy
was to pursue a negotiation, including contacts between the US and
North
Korea.
Mr Blair agreed to discuss that with President Bush, and
that:
“We need to
bind the North Koreans into an agreement that preserved their
dignity
while
ensuring that they could not develop their weapons.”
238
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of
Power:
Countdown to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
239
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of
Power:
Countdown to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
240
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 27 January 2003, ‘North Korea and Iraq: Prime
Minister’s Phone Call with
Putin, 27
January’.
123