The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
377.
Sir David
Manning described the objectives to Dr Rice as compatible with
but
not
identical to US objectives.
378.
It was
recorded at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 29 January that
political and
military
synchronisation and timing “remained fluid”.130
The Cabinet
Office was preparing
a revised
paper on the UK’s objectives that “sought to align the UK and US
positions that
currently
differed”.
379.
The minutes
recorded that Adm Boyce noted that the issues of timing
and
objectives
were urgent and that the US might “leave the UK with little warning
of
military action”.
380.
The current
timelines indicated that US ground forces would not be available
in
the North
before the third week in March, “although there was still a
coercive effect to
be achieved
by continuing to pursue the option”.
381.
CENTCOM
continued planning to mitigate against a decision by President
Bush
to act
earlier than the planning assumptions: “However, the preparedness
of US ground
forces was
behind schedule; as a result A day [Assault Day] was moving towards
G day
[the day
that the ground campaign would begin] rather than G to
A.”
382.
Mr Bowen sent
Sir David Manning a copy of the latest draft of the objectives
on
“It will be
important before the Coalition embarks on military action to ensure
that we
share the
same military objectives with the US, otherwise the strategic
direction of
the
campaign risks falling apart. After your return from the US I
suggest we discuss
383.
Mr Bowen
explained to Sir David Manning that the objectives “flow from our
policy
objectives
published on 7 January”. They had not been agreed by departments,
although
Ministers
had seen them and were “generally content”.
384.
The main tasks
of the Coalition were listed as:
“•
remove the
current Iraqi regime;
•
overcome
the resistance of the Iraqi security forces;
•
deny the
Iraqi regime the use of weapons of mass destruction;
•
identify
and secure the sites where weapons of mass destruction and
their
means of
delivery are located; and
•
secure
essential economic infrastructure, including for utilities and
transport,
from
sabotage and wilful destruction by Iraqis.”
130
Minutes, 29
January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
131
Letter
Bowen to Manning, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’ attaching Paper
[unattributed
and undated], ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.
132
Letter
Bowen to Manning, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
442