The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the
[Security] Council to work together on Phase IV”.81
The
prospects of that had been
“mildly
enhanced” by useful co-operation during negotiations on the
resolution extending
the OFF
programme. Sir Jeremy added:
“The
difficult calculation, of course, is how to take forward any
thought of working
closely
with the Europeans when we have to be joined at the hip to the
Americans
as
well.
“… we here
in New York can in the end do no more than the Prime
Minister
manages to
win in terms of flexibility from the President in
Washington.”
110.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush by video link on the afternoon of 4
April.82
Mr Blair
commented
that reports from discussions with European partners indicated that
they
would like
to “find a way back”. He thought that getting the right “framework
of principles”
for Phase
IV should help.
111.
Mr Blair’s
subsequent discussions with Mr Jacques Chirac, the French
President,
and
Mr Gerhard Schröder, the German Chancellor, are addressed in
Section 9.1.
112.
Officials in
the FCO, the MOD, DFID and the Cabinet Office continued to work
on
plans for
the reconstruction of post-conflict Iraq after the start of the
invasion.
113.
UK efforts to
secure a resolution authorising the post-conflict administration
and
reconstruction
of Iraq are described in Section 9.1.
114.
The UK’s
military contribution to the combat phase (Phase III) of the
military
campaign in
Iraq, the transition to post-conflict military operations (Phase
IV) and the
establishment
of the UK military’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) in southern Iraq
are
described
in Section 8.
115.
Ms Short held
a meeting with DFID officials on 26 March to discuss
Iraq.83
Reflecting
on recent progress to secure a resolution authorising the
post-conflict
administration
and reconstruction of Iraq, Ms Short stated: “The important thing
was for
the world
to know that a resolution for a UN mandate was
coming.”
116.
Officials
reported a sense among departments that a resolution on
reconstruction
might not
be achieved. Ms Short stated that under the Geneva and Hague
Conventions
“no changes
could be made to the [Iraqi] administration by the Occupying
Powers,
except … to
keep systems working for civilians”. The Attorney General had been
clear
81
Letter
Greenstock to Ricketts, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction:
Working the Europeans’.
82
Letter
No.10 [junior official] to Owen, 4 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime
Minister’s Video Conference with
President
Bush’.
83
Minute
Warren to Fernie, 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Secretary of
State’.
22