The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
415.
Mr Qin
Huasun suggested:
“The
Security Council should hear the views of UNSCOM and Iraq on the
question
of
inspections in order to make a fair and reasonable judgement on
progress
achieved in
inspections. Problems … should be appropriately settled
through
dialogue
and co-operation. We are opposed to the use or the threat of force
or any
actions
that might further exacerbate tensions. We hope that the parties
concerned
will
exercise restraint and find a proper solution to the problem
through co-operation
and
dialogue and avoid the escalation of tensions. In particular, the
occurrence of
armed
conflict must be avoided.”
416.
In his memoir,
Mr Annan wrote:
“In late
1997, it was clear the United States had lost patience with the
inspections
process and
was agitating for military action or full Iraqi compliance. UN
inspectors
… destroyed
more weapons of mass destruction than the coalition had during
the
Gulf War …
despite … the regime’s attitude … By this time, Iraq had identified
a
new reason
to resist co-operation; namely, the national security and dignity
of its
Presidential
sites … I knew Saddam had to open these … [to inspection], but I
also
felt deeply
uneasy that the world could go to war over this issue
…”161
417.
In response to
Russian diplomatic activity, Iraq agreed to allow
UNSCOM
to resume
its activities in Iraq.
418.
During a visit
to Moscow on 18 to 19 November, Mr Aziz and
Mr Yevgeny
Primakov,
the Russian Foreign Minister, agreed that Iraq would allow the
return
of UNSCOM
from 20 November.162
419.
The Joint
Communiqué stated that Russia would:
“… actively
contribute, on the basis of Iraq’s implementation of the relevant
Security
Council
resolutions, towards a quick lifting of the sanctions imposed on
Iraq,
especially
the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687, to the letter
and
without
additional conditions.”
420.
The Moscow
Times reported that
Mr Primakov had been very careful to observe
the
substance of UN policy on Iraq, and that he had warned Iraq not to
expect an end
to economic
sanctions until it had closed down its chemical and biological
weapons
programmes.163
The
composition of UN inspections teams would be slightly
adjusted,
but would
retain many US inspectors.
161
Annan
K. Interventions:
A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane,
2012.
162
BBC
News,
20 November 1997, Text of
Iraqi-Russian communiqué on return of UN inspectors.
163
The Moscow
Times,
20 November 1997, Russia can
score points in Iraq crisis.
98