9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
could
provide not only combat MiTTs (Military Transition Teams – see
Section 12.1) but
also combat
force to restore order if security conditions
deteriorated.
488.
Mr Asquith
reported a deeply entrenched US view that the UK
would:
“… continue
to make the facts fit our timelines, a view reinforced by our
argument
that ‘Basra
is different from Baghdad’”.
489.
In conclusion,
Mr Asquith considered:
“How best
to respond? This military view in theatre does not take into
account
the
Afghanistan dimension. We need to remind them of that … There is
some
resonance
to the argument that there is more risk associated in being
cautious,
thereby
delaying transition, losing Iraqi consent and prompting the Iraqis
to ask the
MNF to
leave so that they can finish the business in their own (sectarian)
manner.
But this
will not carry the day with theatre commanders. We will need to
reiterate
clearly the
expectations in the UK of delivering on our planned draw down
timetable
and the
political damage if the US were to deploy forces to Basra in the
transition
process …
The degree to which anti‑JAM/Iran operations in the South ramp up
over
this period
will also affect US views. Most importantly … the MND(SE) plan
must
credibly
address the combat MiTT/combat force capability. I leave to the
military
planners
to decide whether that requires a reduction in the numbers we
currently
plan to
draw down.”
490.
The Iraq
Strategy Group met on 25 January, with Sir Nigel Sheinwald as
Chair.262
He reported
to those present that:
“Ministers
required a document which would settle our own minds, and provide
a
narrative
to persuade the US, and Iraqis, and provide a basis for the Prime
Minister’s
parliamentary
statement in the week beginning 5 February.”
491.
Sir Nigel
asked for the paper to be clear about the tasks that would need to
be
undertaken
post re‑posturing “to underpin the case”. The Group observed that
there was
still a
question mark over the future of Basra Palace:
“The US
were opposed to giving up the option to use Basra Palace, and
wanted
to retain a
US flag over it at least until PIC. Simon McDonald said there
were
insufficient
funds for keeping a Consulate in central Basra. For commercial,
political
and
symbolic reasons, [Sir Nigel Sheinwald] expected we would want a
Consulate in
central
Basra if the security conditions improved.”
492.
In the light
of the problems he had observed during his visit, Mr McDonald
told the
Group that
he thought the UK’s plans were too ambitious.
262
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 26 January 2007,
‘Iraq Strategy Group, 25 January’.
91