The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
threaten
his neighbours. But nor do we want sanctions to just erode away, or
allow
Saddam to
trigger recurring crises over the next five years. That argues for
scaling
back to
targeted sanctions, while suspending broader economic sanctions;
keeping
control of
oil revenues; and finding a way out of patrolling the southern
NFZ.”
57.
Mr Sawers also
sent Mr Blair the JIC Assessment on developments in
Iraq’s
regional
relations. Mr Sawers described it as providing “useful background”
on how
events were
“combining to ease the pressure on Iraq and make it more difficult
for us”.
58.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry:
“It wasn’t
absolutely clear whether UNMOVIC’s return to Iraq was desirable
because
it could
have provoked another confrontation … there wasn’t any great
confidence
that
UNMOVIC would be any more successful than UNSCOM had
been.
…
“There was
no change in Iraqi attitudes, there was no readiness, really, on
the Iraqi
side to
co-operate with the United Nations and we didn’t think that we
could force
Saddam
through military action to accept an inspections
regime.”37
59.
Mr Blair
commented on Mr Sawers’ minute:
“My
firm view
is option (ii) [linking a shift on sanctions with the return of
inspectors].
It puts
sanctions to rest; gets inspectors back in and even if he [Saddam
Hussein]
plays
around, at least it’s obvious. But Iraq policy is going nowhere at
present and
I am
genuinely appalled by the human consequences.”38
60.
Mr McKane
responded to Mr Sawers’ minute on 27 November, asking if
there
was “one
further policy option”, of “dismissing” any thought of moving
UNMOVIC into
Iraq and
instead working to enforce sanctions.39
On the
question of whether a shift on
sanctions
should be linked with the return of inspectors, Mr McKane commented
that an
inspection
regime would not be a stable, long-term solution but it would help
to justify
publicly
the suspension of sanctions.
61.
Mr Sawers
recorded Mr Blair’s views in a letter to Mr Cook’s Principal
Private
Secretary,
Mr Sherard Cowper-Coles, on 27 November.40
Copies of
the letter were sent
to the
Private Offices of Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, and Sir
Richard Wilson,
the Cabinet
Secretary, and to Mr McKane.
62.
Mr Sawers
described Mr Blair as feeling “uncomfortably positioned on Iraq
policy
at
present”, and continued:
37
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, page 16.
38
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Sawers to Prime Minister, 24 November 2000,
‘Iraq’.
39
Minute
McKane to Sawers, 27 November 2000, ‘Iraq’.
40
Letter
Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 27 November 2000, ‘Iraq’.
202