The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
230.
Behind this
optimism sat a “confident and capable” Iraqi Army with
“complete
freedom of
movement throughout the city”, meaning that “we will soon have
reached the
point where
we can say with confidence that we have fulfilled our training
mission for
14 Division”.
231.
During his
visit, Mr Hutton confirmed with Gen Odierno that he was fully
content
with plans
to draw down the vast majority of UK troops by mid 2009, adding
that:
“The phased
movement south of additional US forces will help to ensure that
the
withdrawal
of our own combat troops is as seamless as possible. He [Gen
Odierno]
is alive to
the presentational risks and will, I am sure, speak positively
about our
contribution.”
232.
Mr Hutton
reported that Prime Minister Maliki had told him that he wanted
to
build
a strong, broad-based relationship with the UK and was keen to
start bilateral
discussions
on the UK SOFA as soon as possible to ensure that an agreement was
in
place by
the end of the year.
233.
Ambassador
Crocker and Ambassador Satterfield were more downbeat,
and
saw
significant difficulties ahead. Mr Hutton explained that the
UK had decided that
before
pursuing the UK SOFA he would await formal agreement from the
Council of
Representatives
of the US/Iraq SOFA, on which it was largely based.
234.
Mr Hutton
concluded:
“Should the
UK fail to secure a SOFA or a UNSCR extension, the
operational
and presentational
risks associated with a hasty exit would be severe indeed
…
We will
need to watch this very closely, and to use any and all diplomatic
means
at our
disposal to reach an agreement as early as possible.”
235.
The MND(SE)
weekly letter on 26 October said that Gen Mohammed and
Governor
Wa’ili had agreed to meet for the first time (having previously
refused to
do so),
paving the way for co-operation on security issues ahead of the
forthcoming
236.
The letter
also described a visit by the MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan
Assessment
Team, “not
one but two multi-disciplinary teams” headed by a retired General
and a
former
Ambassador and featuring “a broad cross-section of diplomats,
academics
and
advisors”. Gen Odierno had tasked the team “to make an independent
campaign
assessment
to inform the rewrite of the Joint Campaign Plan”.
237.
Mr Hutton
reported to Cabinet on 28 October that the security situation in
Iraq had
been
“completely transformed and continued to improve”.88
The MNF had
had significant
successes
in disrupting and destroying AQ-I leadership. The UK would hand
over Basra
87
Minute
Storrie to CJO, 26 October 2008, ‘MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 26
October 2008’.
88
Cabinet
Conclusions, 28 October 2008.
420