9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
announcing
his own six month freeze on activity on 29 August. But
I have always
rather felt
that that was him following events, rather than driving events from
his
bolthole in
Iran.”
SIS6 told
the Inquiry that the understanding reached provided a six-month
window for the
UK to pull
out of Basra safely and re-locate to the Air
Station.157
Asked about
the impact on security in Basra City, SIS6 explained that he did
not know,
because the
UK was not on the ground there.158
A
government official who worked closely with the military told the
Inquiry he recalled that
the
negotiations had been described as “a treatment of the
symptoms” which had not
“brought
about a cure” but was rather intended to “buy time and …
space”.159
318.
On 7
September, Mr McDonald provided Mr Brown with a timeline
of actions on
Iraq
leading up to his statement to Parliament after
Recess.160
The main
points were:
•
a video
conference with President Bush, to understand his reaction to
the
Petraeus/Crocker
report, on 10 September;
•
an update
to Cabinet by Mr Browne;
•
a meeting
with Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker on 18
September;
•
discussions
between US and UK officials and military about future UK
role;
•
NSID to
consider options and reach a view; and
•
a visit to
Basra by Mr Brown in early October.
319.
Mr McDonald
reported that work was under way in the MOD on options for a
UK
military
contribution “in the next phase” post-PIC. There were two possible
models:
•
A small
group of specialists and a headquarters in Baghdad, plus naval and
air
support,
with a “training component” in the South, totalling
1,800–2,000.
•
A large
enough force to enable the UK to maintain command of
MND(SE),
totalling
around 3,800.
320.
After a short
visit to Basra and Baghdad from 5 to 7 September, Gen
Dannatt
reported a
“growing, albeit modest, sense of optimism about the strategic
opportunities
that are
now potentially being presented to the coalition and specifically
to our own
forces in
South-East Iraq”.161
321.
That sense of
optimism had been generated by a combination of the US
surge,
Sunni
engagement and Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire.
157
Private
hearing, 2010, page 23. Based on redacted material.
158
Private
hearing, 2010, pages 28-29. Based on redacted
material.
159
Private
hearing, 2011.
160
Minute
McDonald to Brown, 7 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Timeline Before your
H/C statement (and update
on
Pakistan)’.
161
Minute
Dannatt to CDS, 10 September 2007, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq 5-7 Sep
07’.
243