The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1048.
The paper
continued:
“ISTAR
issues are often inextricably linked to a multitude of other lines
of
development
or capabilities, which may, in turn, also be pinchpoints and
subject
to
considerable pressure; helicopters are a prime example. Equally,
the solution
may not be
equipment based. Rather it might be process or enabler specific.
For
example,
access to existing information, bandwidth or capability through
exploitation
of
frequency, downlink or a particular National/Coalition product or
database.”
1049.
The options
for mitigating short‑term shortfalls were broken down into five
areas,
recognising
that getting ISTAR right required more than a suite of dedicated
ISTAR
assets, but
that it relied upon “all aspects of the network-enabled
capability”:
•
Improving
processes for collecting, storing and processing
intelligence.
•
Improving
access to coalition capability such as the CJPTF.
Lt Gen Houghton
had been
tasked separately with improving apportionment, co‑ordination
and
liaison
with US and other MNF forces.
•
Re-apportionment
of national assets including: the deployment of
Northern
Ireland
based Islanders to Iraq or Afghanistan; increasing the number
of
Defender
aircraft; increasing the number of Nimrod MR2, although those
were
unlikely to
become available before November 2006; UOR action to bring
Merlin
Mk1 up to
“theatre‑entry standard”; and redeploying Phoenix to Iraq after
the
summer – an
option that would have “painful implications” for a UAV
regiment
in Afghanistan.
•
Extant and
emerging UORs: a USUR had been submitted and endorsed
by
PJHQ for
the provision of a “long range, long loiter, real time FMV
surveillance
system” in
May. That was similar to the USUR produced in April 2003 that led
to
the CJPTF.
Further action was awaiting the outcome of
Lt Gen Houghton’s work
on getting
greater access to coalition capability. Other UORs were in train
to
address the
lack of ground terminals able to downlink ISTAR data.
•
New
capabilities: options included fitting additional Defender aircraft
with the
necessary
sensors and downlink capability; further increasing the
number
of ground
ISTAR terminals; using commercially owned UAV systems
such
as the US
had done with Scan Eagle which could deliver capability
quickly
(“within
about nine months”) but did raise liability issues; advancing
commercial
off‑the‑shelf
UAVs such as Predator B under the DABINETT programme
or
leasing
Hermes 450/Hermes 180 air vehicles. There was no potential to
bring
forward
elements of the Watchkeeper programme.
1050.
Future
equipment programmes would deliver improved ISTAR effect within
the
next few
years, but none before November 2006.
178