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6.2  |  Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003
Mr Hoon and Mr Straw were telling Mr Blair that the US could act as early as
that weekend, and “some of our forces would have to be in before”.194
586.  Mr Hemming wrote to Mr David Brummell, the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers,
on 12 March stating:
“It is clear that legal controversy will undoubtedly surround the announcement of
any decision by the Government to proceed to military action in the absence of the
adoption of a further resolution by the UN Security Council. The CDS is naturally
concerned to be assured that his order to commit UK Armed Forces to the conflict
in such circumstances would be a lawful order by him. I have informed the CDS that
if the Attorney General has advised that he is satisfied that the proposed military
action by the UK would be in accordance with national and international law, he
[CDS] can properly give his order committing UK forces.
“In view of the rapidly developing situation, I thought that the Attorney would wish to
know what I have said on this question.”195
587.  Lord Goldsmith and Mr Brummell agreed that:
It would be proper for Mr Brummell to confirm to Mr Hemming that the proposed
military action would be in accordance with national and international law.
“[It] would be necessary to prepare a statement setting out the Attorney’s view
of the legal position which could be deployed at Cabinet and in Parliament the
following week.”196
588.  Mr Brummell wrote to Mr Hemming on 14 March to “confirm” that Lord Goldsmith
was “satisfied that the proposed military action by the UK would be in accordance with
national and international law”.197
589.  Copies of the letter were sent to the Private Offices of Mr Hoon, Adm Boyce and
Sir Kevin Tebbit, as well as to Mr Bowen and Ms Juliet Wheldon, the Treasury Solicitor.
590.  Lord Boyce told the Inquiry:
“… the propriety and/or the legality of what we were about to do was obviously a
concern of mine, not least of it, since, somewhat against my better instincts, we had
signed up to the ICC [International Criminal Court]. I always made it perfectly clear
to the Prime Minister face-to-face, and, indeed, to the Cabinet, that if we were invited
194  Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown
to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.
195  Letter Hemming to Brummell, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Position of the CDS’.
196  Minute Brummell, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal Basis for Use of Force – Note of discussion with Attorney
General Thursday, 13 March 2003’.
197  Letter Brummell to Hemming, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Position of the CDS’.
479
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