The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The figure
of 30,000 contrasts with what was understood in PJHQ in late April,
when
Gen Reith
reported that Gen Franks had told him that he still expected the US
“to have
to provide
between 120,000 and 150,000” personnel.111
At around
the same time as Gen Franks’ order, Mr Donald Rumsfeld (US
Secretary of
Defense)
cancelled the deployment of a further 50,000 combat troops who had
been
scheduled
to arrive in Iraq shortly.112
According
to Hard
Lessons:
“Rumsfeld’s
decision shocked some commanders on the ground, including
Coalition
Forces Land
Component Commander Lieutenant General David McKiernan,
who
were
counting on the additional manpower to provide a secure environment
for
post-conflict
stabilization.”
Lt Gen
Sanchez’s view was that “overall, the concurrence of Franks’
drawdown orders and
Rumsfeld’s
… directive created havoc throughout the forces … Confusion was the
order
Earlier in
2003, giving evidence to the US Senate Armed Services
Committee,
General Eric
Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the US Army, had commented that, in his
view, any
Occupation
of Iraq would require “several hundred thousand”
troops.114
At the
time, Gen Shinseki’s comment was dismissed publicly by the
Pentagon, and
Mr Paul
Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, told the US House of
Representatives’
Budget
Committee that the number was “wildly off the mark” and that the
figure was closer
In his
account of his time in Iraq, Ambassador L Paul Bremer recalls
having been shown
a draft
report prior to his deployment to Iraq which suggested that, for a
population
the size of
Iraq, around 500,000 ground troops would be required for the
stabilisation
operation.
This was “more than three times the number of foreign troops now
deployed to
Iraq”.116
Ambassador
Bremer sent a copy of the report to Secretary Rumsfeld, but did
not
receive a
reply.
221.
The issue of
deploying the Headquarters of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps
(ARRC) to
Iraq was first raised as a possibility after the invasion in
mid-April.
222.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office explained to No.10:
“From a
military perspective, use of HQ ARRC would impact upon the size of
role we
could play
in Southern Iraq … Even if this problem could be resolved … for the
UK
111 Minute
MA/CJO to PSO/CDS, 28 April 2003, ‘CJO Visit Report to TELIC AO
24-28 April’.
112
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
113
Sanchez RS
& Phillips DT. Wiser in
Battle: A Soldier’s Story. HarperCollins,
2008.
114
USA
Today, 25
February 2003, Army Chief:
Forces to occupy Iraq massive; Sanchez
RS & Phillips DT.
Wiser in
Battle: A Soldier’s Story. HarperCollins,
2008.
115
USA
Today, 27
February 2003, Ex-army
boss: Pentagon won’t admit reality in Iraq.
116
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold, 2006.
166