The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
762.
Lt Gen Reith
was also asked to provide a paper considering southern options
for
UK
involvement if Turkey denied the northern option.
763.
Reporting on
the meeting to Sir David Manning, Mr Bowen
wrote:
“The
military are pressing for a decision on whether the UK should be
offering,
with
caveats, Package 3 … The argument for doing so is that the
Americans now
need to
know in principle whether they should plan on our participation and
that …
our acceptability
as a major player in the North needs to be broached early
with
the Turks.
“The
conclusion … was that the MOD should seek a positive decision in
principle …
[that]
would expose to the US … the time lag … between a decision to
deploy and
deployment
on the ground. The key decision to proceed in practice would be
taken
764.
Mr Bowen
added that the MOD had underlined:
“… that
diplomacy ought to be backed by the threat of the use of force. In
the
game of
coercion, military planning and preparation can have a beneficial
effect in
achieving a
peaceful outcome. Moreover, in case the diplomatic track is
brought
to a halt,
we should endeavour to reduce the gap between that point and
the
enforcement
action we threaten. This would involve us being more up‑beat
about
our
contingency planning, without moving into war‑mongering
mode.”
765.
Mr Bowen
also wrote that:
•
A decision
in principle in favour of Package 3 would help the UK to influence
US
thinking to
a greater extent than had been possible up to that point,
“especially
in relation
to the aftermath of any military action”.
•
In “making
a decision in principle, without final commitment, we would
stress
that this
reflected the UK political situation and was not specifically
linked to
authorisation
through the UN”.
•
While it
could be argued that agreeing in principle to provide Package 3
was
“no different”
from the position on Packages 1 and 2, there was “no
doubt”
that a
commitment to deploy land forces was “a different matter
from
deployments
in the air or at sea”.
766.
The MOD would
be writing to No.10, and Mr Hoon was seeking a meeting
with
Mr Blair
on 17 October to discuss the issue.
767.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Powell: “A foretaste of the line MOD
will
306
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 9 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff
Meeting’.
307
Manuscript
comment Manning to Powell, 10 October 2002, on Minute Bowen to
Manning, 9 October
2002,
‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff Meeting’.
290