The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
for the
Coalition presence is diminishing. Recent incidents in Basra will
increase
animosity
to the Multi-National Forces (MNF) in some quarters …
“Shia
political factions, including some violent extremists, are able to
exert strong
influence
on local Iraqi authorities and security forces. Most members of the
security
forces,
particularly the police, have multiple loyalties. Under pressure
their reliability
will be
doubtful. A significant number actively colludes with Shia
extremist militias.
The current
Iraqi government has neither the will nor capacity to tackle
these
problems:
this will probably not change after the elections.”
268.
The JIC
concluded that:
“In the
South the widespread expectation of MNF withdrawal, together with
the
current
focus on manoeuvring for December’s elections, is adding pressure
to
a complex
political and security landscape … The security situation is
unlikely
to improve
in the build up to the elections. Shia politics in the South are
deeply
fractured …
Criminal groups will … exploit the absence of effective civil
authority.
Shia
extremists from all groups will resort to violence: against the
MNF, rival factions,
or the
Sunni minority. Deepening sectarian tensions and further attacks by
Sunni
Arab
insurgents and jihadists are likely. Managing these pressures will
depend
crucially
on whether al Sadr encourages renewed violence or remains willing
and
able to
restrain his followers.”
269.
On 30
September, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary sent
Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary a
paper containing the advice of FCO, MOD and DFID officials on
the
implications
of the Jameat incident.130
Mr Straw
had not yet seen and agreed their
advice. The
paper said:
“The …
incident … highlights what was previously more opaque, that we face
acute
challenges
in achieving our objectives in the South-East region. Stability in
the
South-East
is being threatened by intense rivalry among political parties and
their
militias.
Criminality, jockeying for patronage and leaders’ differing
political visions
are being
exacerbated by tribalism and increasing religiosity. Specifically,
this has
a severe
impact on the effectiveness of the police service. In better
circumstances
police
training should by now have gone beyond the basics to deal with the
broader
problems
posed by divergent loyalties to both militias and
police.”
270.
The paper
observed that “alternative options to our current policy are
limited”. As
the UK was
no longer an Occupying Power, “asserting
direct British control over
local
130
Letter
Hayes to Quarrey, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra’ attaching Paper
FCO/MOD/DFID,
30 September
2005, ‘South-East Iraq: Impact of Security Incident in
Basra’.
534