The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
common
interests”. Striving for a political solution on Iraq was “in the
best
interests”
of Russia, the US and the rest of the world.263
755.
Separately,
Sir Roderic Lyne reported that Mr Ivanov’s statement
was:
“… claiming
that Iraq ‘no longer presents a threat to international peace
and
security’
and that ‘under these conditions, the use of force against Iraq,
particularly
with
references to the previous UNSC resolutions has absolutely no
grounds,
756.
Mr Ivanov
had stressed that resolution 1441 gave “no one the right to an
automatic
use of
force” and said that Russia wanted to ensure that the Security
Council retained
control of
the situation.
757.
The US
decision on the timing of military action determined the
time
available
for diplomatic negotiations.
758.
As the
evidence in this and preceding Sections of the Report shows, the
timetable
available
for diplomatic negotiations on the second resolution was determined
by
President
Bush’s decisions on the timing of military action.
759.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock identified President Bush’s decision on the timing
of
military
preparations as the main factor leading to the end of the attempt
to secure
760.
Sir
Christopher Meyer, the British Ambassador to Washington from
1997
to February
2003, told the Inquiry that “when you looked at the timetable for
the
inspections,
it was impossible to see how Blix could bring the inspection
process to
a conclusion
for better or for worse by March”.266
761.
Sir
Christopher added that had the effect of turning resolution 1441,
which had
been a
challenge to Saddam Hussein, “on its head”. The military timetable
meant that
the UK
found itself “scrabbling for the smoking gun” to prove that Saddam
Hussein
was guilty.
762.
Mr Jonathan
Powell told the Inquiry that, from January 2003, the UK
had
repeatedly
asked for, and been given, more time by President Bush; but by
mid-March
“he wasn’t
going to give us more time”.267
263
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 17 March 2003,
A Russian
Resolve for Peace and
Partnership by
Igor Ivanov.
264
Telegram 89
Moscow to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Russian
Reactions’.
265
Public
hearing, 27 November 2009, pages 76-79.
266
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, page 52.
267
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, page 82.
534