6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

922. Sir Kevin added that one of the lessons of the UK experience in the 1990‑1991

Gulf Conflict was that:

“In 1990, we learned that, once we committed ourselves to a ground force

contribution, the planning process opened completely … and we were able to

influence it, and that experience … still influenced the way we thought …”363

923. Sir Kevin subsequently stated that the lesson the UK had drawn from the 1991 Gulf

Conflict was that only “ground forces in significant numbers” really secured influence;

and that demonstrating commitment would put the UK in a better position to influence

US behaviour “and the way in which Saddam and his regime perceived the seriousness

of our position”.364

924. Lt Gen Fry told the Inquiry that “the larger the contribution we made, the more

influence we felt we would have over American planning and the ability to shape things

in the future”.365

925. Asked in what specific areas it was thought, in the second half of 2002, British

influence could apply, Lt Gen Fry replied:

“… we felt at a tactical level we might be able to influence the Americans in certain

ways … about the conduct of operations, and to a certain extent that was true.

I don’t think we ever fundamentally influenced their level of military ambition or

necessarily even their scheme of manoeuvre, but I think we did assist and shape

their views in some ways.

“But I think … the full benefit that this should have given the UK was never going

to be visible to me, because it seems to me that it was the military contribution …

which brought the influence which should then have been deployed at governmental

and diplomatic levels.”366

926. The debate in the MOD suggests that there was no unanimity about whether

significant ground forces were required to influence the US or that could be

achieved by the forces within Package 2.

927. On 9 October, ACM Squire stated that Package 2 would “not entail a loss of

influence”.

928. On 15 October Mr Hoon wrote: “In principle, both packages could strengthen

that relationship: Package 2 alone should easily surpass any other conceivable non‑US

contribution, except perhaps that of Turkey.”

363 Public hearing, 3 December 2009, page 46.

364 Private hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 69‑70.

365 Public hearing, 16 December 2009, page 6.

366 Public hearing, 16 December 2009, pages 57‑58.

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