3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
6.
The policy had
a number of dimensions. Its key components were:
•
a
prohibition on the possession of WMD or long-range ballistic
missiles,
or programmes
to develop such capabilities;
•
an arms
embargo;
•
economic
sanctions; and
•
a strong
deterrence component provided by US and UK forces stationed in
the
region
enforcing the northern and southern No-Fly Zones (NFZs) and
supporting
the arms
embargo and economic sanctions regime.
The UN
Security Council is composed of five Permanent Members – China,
France, the
Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States; and ten
non-permanent
Member
States, elected by the UN General Assembly for two-year terms and
not eligible
for
immediate re-election.
The
Presidency of the Security Council is held by the Member States of
the Security
Council in
turn in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each
President holds
office for
one calendar month.
Each Member
State has one vote. Decisions on substantive matters, and the
adoption
of a
Security Council resolution, require nine positive votes, without
any of the five
Permanent
Members voting against the decision. That is usually described as
the “veto”
power held
by the Permanent Members. Decisions on procedural matters are made
by
an affirmative
vote of at least nine of the 15 Member States.
7.
Throughout the
1990s, there were concerns about the willingness of
President
Saddam
Hussein’s regime to disarm in accordance with the obligations
imposed by
the UN.
8.
After the
election of May 1997, the Government had to deal with a series
of
confrontations
between Iraq and the international community about the ability
of
inspectors
from the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to fulfil its remit,
including
difficulties
over access to sites which Iraq had designated as Presidential
palaces.
Those
events and the action in the UN Security Council, and by Mr Kofi
Annan,
UN
Secretary-General from January 1997 to December 2006, to persuade
Iraq
to co‑operate,
are set out in Section 1.
9.
It was widely
assumed that Saddam Hussein had retained some of his chemical
and
biological
capability and a small number of ballistic missiles which might be
armed with
chemical or
biological warheads, and that he had aspirations to preserve and
enhance
his
capabilities for the future.
10.
The UK
Government considered that a willingness to use force was an
essential
element of
UK policy in persuading Saddam Hussein to co-operate.
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