10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
584.
Mr Dinham
told the Inquiry that the Better Basra Action Plan was a “proper,
agreed,
bought-into,
cross-Whitehall plan”, which had led to greater unity of purpose
across the
UK
effort.333
He added
that the Plan did not seek to reflect the totality of the UK
effort; for
example,
major DFID projects to increase power supply were starting to come
on stream
and
contributed to achieving the UK’s objectives.
585.
Mr Etherington
told the Inquiry that the Better Basra Action Plan was “a set
of
aspirations”
rather than a plan.334
586.
Mrs Beckett
told Cabinet on 13 July that responsibility for security in
Muthanna
had been
handed from British to Iraqi forces earlier that
day.335
587.
On 19 July,
the JIC judged that violence was at the highest sustained level
since
April 2003,
outpacing the Iraqi Government’s ability to
respond.336
“Spiralling
sectarian
violence”
was the most immediate threat to Iraq’s progress.
588.
Mr Patey’s
valedictory report from Baghdad on 20 July opened with the
warning:
“Strategic
failure in Iraq a distinct possibility but not
inevitable.” 337
589.
Mr Patey
advised that:
“Without
progress on security the encouraging start made by DPM [Deputy
Prime
Minister]
Barham Salih and his economic team will be stillborn. The exodus
of
businessmen
and the Iraqi middle class continues due to security concerns.
They
will take
some persuading to return a second time but their entrepreneurial
skills
will be
vital if the country is to thrive.”
590.
Mr Patey’s
valedictory report was passed to Mr Blair on 21
July.338
591.
The ISG
reflected on reporting from Baghdad, and its implications for the
existing
strategy,
on 27 July.339
The ISG
agreed that although success or failure in Baghdad
would be
critical to overall campaign success in Iraq and was therefore the
coalition’s
highest
priority, the “best way for the UK to contribute to the wider
military campaign was
to continue
to focus our limited resources on MND(SE), in particular, on
Basra”.
592.
At the
meeting, Mr Dinham argued that the UK should focus its future
support on
central
government and in particular on budgetary management and critical
economic
reforms.
Iraq was now enjoying increased revenue as a result of higher oil
prices and
slowly
rising exports; the challenge was to ensure those revenues were
redirected from
wasteful
and damaging subsidies to investment in public services. The
security situation
333
Public
hearing, 17 December 2009, page 67.
334
Public
hearing, 9 July 2010, page 26.
335
Cabinet
Minutes, 13 July 2006.
336
JIC
Assessment, 19 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Insurgency, Sectarianism and
Violence’.
337
eGram
31514/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 20 July 2006, ‘Iraq:
Valedictory’.
338
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 21 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Update and Maliki
Meeting’.
339
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 27 July 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 27 July’.’
293