The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

598. ACM Bagnall told the Inquiry:

“I was not aware of any concerns which were raised before the invasion about the

quality and the accuracy of information available in MOD about equipment delivery

to Iraq. I was subsequently told (I think by DCDS(EC)) about concerns relating to

the availability of equipment delivered under the UOR process, and I recall that he

asked for agreement to send some of his people into theatre to monitor progress.

I also recall that I supported this request, but for reasons I cannot remember, the

request was denied. What I was aware of were concerns relating to asset tracking.

This was not a new issue, and it was a topic which we had been working on for

some time.”318

599. In his evidence to the Inquiry, Lord Boyce stated that he could not recall whether

Ministers had ever been advised of the known weaknesses in asset tracking or the risks

this entailed.319

600. Lord Boyce stated:

“It was absolutely correct that a lot of our stores problems in theatre come 2003

were as a result of poor asset tracking – and I wonder what the situation is today

if we were to go and ask.”

601. Problems with logistic support were identified soon after the campaign.

602. RAdm Wood’s findings in his report to ACM Pledger on 20 May included:

“A combination of OP SEC and late definition of force elements and operational

plans all exposed Defence’s growing dependence on industry as a materiel provider

as well as the fragility of some key planning assumptions. This was exacerbated

by some less than adequate personnel and equipment readiness. In the event,

this inevitably manifested itself as significant logistic risk which imposed

operational risk.”320

603. RAdm Wood also specified that he considered:

• “Inadequate asset tracking and visibility hindered material preparation for war.”

• An “urgent review” of the provisioning policy, processes and requirements for

land units was required because the supply chain was “under extreme strain

and, at times, unable to cope” trying to meet equipment requirements.

604. In his post-operation report on 6 October 2003, Major General Peter Wall,

GOC 1 (UK) Div May 2003 to January 2005, wrote that one of the “key areas” to note

318 Statement, 6 January 2011, page 4.

319 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 40-41.

320 Minute CDL to VCDS, 27 May 2003, ‘Visit by DG Ops (DLO) to Op TELIC: 10-16 May 2003’ attaching

Minute Wood to Pledger, 20 May 2003, ‘Op TELIC Trip Report – 10-16 May 2003’.

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