8 | The
invasion
raised that
even in places that had been secured by the Coalition in the South,
fear of
regime
reprisals continued to hold sway.
359.
Mr Blair
concluded that the messages to the Iraqi people about their future
should
be
reinforced. In the South we could demonstrate how life could be
improved.
360.
Following the
Chiefs of Staff meeting on 3 April, Mr Jim Drummond,
Assistant
Head of the
Overseas and Defence Secretariat in the Cabinet Office,
advised
Sir David Manning
that:
“The next
two days should tell whether the momentum created by the latest
US
advance
will carry them into Baghdad and/or prompt regime collapse. More
likely,
the US will
attempt to gain a stranglehold and then await reinforcements
through the
4th
Infantry Division which is now starting to unload in Kuwait. If the
latter, the main
battle for
Baghdad would be fought in May. In the interim, the US would look
for the
fall of
Basra, and some of the other towns which it has bypassed. General
Reith,
who has
just returned from theatre reported that British forces hope to
complete
the taking
of az-Zubayr within the next 48 hours and Basra in the next 2–3
weeks.
They are
now getting a good flow of information out of Basra and have
identified
Shia groups
who would be willing to take on Saddam’s
irregulars.” 194
361.
Cabinet on
3 April was informed that:
•
the US
advance had been remarkable and it would consolidate its
position;
•
UK forces
had taken control of most towns in the region and were
“waiting
for the
right moment” to take over Basra; it could provide a model
for
dealing
with Baghdad; and
•
progress
would be uneven and the Government would need to be
steady
in its
resolve.
362.
At Cabinet,
Mr Blair said that the military campaign could best be
described in
three
phases.195
In the
first, Coalition Forces had taken a strategic grip on the
country,
advancing
from the south, preventing Iraqi aggression towards Jordan or
Israel in the
west and
fixing Iraqi forces in the North and East. The second phase was one
of steady
advance. US
forces were advancing beyond Karbala and al-Kut to encircle
Baghdad.
The UK
Division was “chipping away at Basra, taking control of most of the
towns in the
region and
waiting for the right moment to take over Basra
itself”.
363.
Mr Hoon
told his colleagues that the US advance had been remarkable
and
the leading
units were within 15 miles of Baghdad. US forces would consolidate
their
position as
they progressed, bringing in reinforcements. Once Baghdad was
isolated,
the
military question would be how to deal with it.
194
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 3 April 2003, ‘Chiefs Meeting’.
195
Cabinet
Conclusions, 3 April 2003.
61