1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
233.
UNSCOM hoped
that the diminution in the quality of information and the
quantity
of documents
provided since mid-February, and the difficulties with inspections
in March,
“did not
indicate a return to the non-co-operative attitude demonstrated by
Iraq prior
to the
summer of 1995”.
234.
Iraq’s
biological weapons facilities, and growth media it had purchased,
were
destroyed
under UNSCOM supervision in May and June 1996.102
235.
In May 1996,
Iraq admitted that the documents handed over on 20 August
1995
“constituted
only a portion” of the documentation which had been concealed; the
rest
had “been
burnt just a few days” earlier, “at another farm west of
Baghdad”.103
236.
In May, UNSCOM
sent a team to Iraq to conduct interviews with Iraqi
officials
believed to
be involved in concealment activities.104
Iraq
“abruptly” terminated its
co-operation
with the inspectors, and claimed that Lt Gen Kamil had been
entirely
responsible
for the concealment programme, a claim which was retracted in
August.
237.
A JIC
Assessment on 12 June 1996 reflected the concerns about
Iraq’s
concealment
activities.105
238.
In relation to
ballistic missiles, the JIC stated:
“Information
obtained in the wake of the … defection has, however, led
UNSCOM
to judge
that missile components, launchers and possibly complete SCUD
missiles
remain
hidden. We doubt whether there are any concealed missiles in Iraq
but it is
likely that
components remain.”
239.
The JIC also
assessed that:
“If all UN
controls were to be removed and Iraq could purchase the
technology
and
expertise required … an accurate 1,000km range missile could
probably be
produced
within three to five years. A 300–500km range SCUD type missile
could
be indigenously
manufactured within two years.”
102
UN Security
Council, 11 October 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/848).
103
UN Security
Council, 11 October 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/848).
104
UN Security
Council, 11 October 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/848).
105
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
51.
65