The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

215.  Sir Nigel wrote that, after the elections:

“… we have to focus on outcomes, not just process … What we need is a centrist

government capable of (a) executive effectiveness and (b) political inclusiveness

or at least a government with a strong centrist/non-religious component. In present

circumstances, the only person capable of fitting this bill, for all his faults, is Ayad

Allawi. I see it as a legitimate aim of British policy to buttress him and others in the

centre of Iraqi politics …”

216.  Sir Nigel concluded:

“Above all, we (ie Khalilzad and ourselves) will need to ensure that a new Iraqi

government is formed quickly after the December elections and has the best

possible composition from the point of view of our objectives.”

217.  Sir Nigel recommended that the UK should continue its work on Sunni outreach,

upgrade its political effort in Basra and provide “a clear demonstration that we are

taking our legacy seriously”. The UK also needed to establish political channels to

Muqtada al‑Sadr and Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani.

218.  On security, Sir Nigel noted that it would be important for the MNF to get the right

balance both between ISF training and counter-insurgency work, and action against

foreign fighters and dealing with “home-grown” Iraqi insurgents. He observed that:

“The key new point over the past few months has been increased and vicious

sectarianism. Some of this is coming from the insurgents; some of it is coming from

Shia elements within the police and armed forces, and from the Shia militia. This

not only risks an escalation into a much bigger civil conflict, it is also changing the

political climate, and eroding even further Sunni trust in the new political institutions.

We have to come down very hard on the Iraqi government on this.”

219.  Sir Nigel recommended strengthened US/UK and UK Ministerial co-ordination

structures. There should be monthly meetings of DOP(I) chaired by Mr Blair, with

fortnightly meetings in between chaired alternately by Mr Straw and Dr Reid which

“should aggressively chase progress against our strategy”.

220.  At the end of his minute, Sir Nigel concluded:

“In short, we have to cut our strategic cloth according to the environment we are

now in and our resources. We cannot turn back the clock to May 2003. Overall, and

in a rough and ready way, our best chance is to ensure that we prop up the centre

in Iraqi politics, do all we can to get an effective government after December, focus

on key improvements meanwhile to the ISF, and ensure an integrated political and

security campaign in Iraq. On that basis we stand a reasonable chance of securing

the political and security transition we want, including starting the draw-down of our

forces next year.”

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