9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
283.
In discussion
about Iraq, Mr Blair described the December election as “a
one‑off
opportunity
to deliver a strong, moderate central government” and identified
four
priorities
for the period ahead:
•
ensuring
the Sunni outreach strategy was delivered;
•
refining
the coalition’s public message to be clear that it wanted to begin
draw
down the
following year, depending on the state of the insurgency and the
ISF;
•
getting the
police training strategy right; and
•
drawing the
right lessons from the Red Team Report about securing
cities
from which
terrorists had been removed, including by developing local
civil
authorities.
284.
On 3 October,
a senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1)
wrote
to
Mr Asquith with an account of the meeting that had been
authorised in September.136
He wrote
that during the meeting it had become evident that MAS1 “was not
speaking on
behalf of
al-Sadr and was pursuing a personal initiative to effect the
release of [JAM1]”:
“[MAS1’s]
stance was unequivocal: the detention of [JAM1] represented a
major
obstacle to
stability in Basra and HMG could instead be encouraging Iraqi Shia,
like
[JAM1], who
opposed Iranian interference in Iraq’s affairs. [JAM1]’s arrest
sent a
clear
signal that HMG supported the unrepresentative ‘pro-Tehran’
government in
Baghdad.
Curiously, [MAS1] conceded that [JAM1] had British blood on his
hands
from an
earlier stage of the conflict but said that, since OMS [Office of
the Martyr
Sadr]’s
change of policy, these earlier crimes were no longer
relevant.”
285.
In response,
MAS1 had been told that “[JAM1]’s arrest was in response to
criminal
activity
and was not a political issue” and the senior official reported
that no commitment
was made,
“beyond agreeing to convey [MAS1]’s concerns to
London”.
286.
It was unclear
how good the relationship was between Muqtada al-Sadr
and
MAS1. In an
attached report a different official said that there were
indications elsewhere
that senior
OMS officials were lobbying current and former members of the
Iraqi
Government
in an effort to secure JAM1’s release.
287.
The senior
official proposed to test the extent to which the exchange
reflected
the views
of Muqtada al-Sadr, by sending a message through other means
seeking
confirmation
of his support.
288.
Mr Asquith
responded to say that before doing so the senior official should
check
that
Mr Patey was content.137
136
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Asquith, 3 October 2005,
‘Overture
from Muqtada al-Sadr’ plus attachment.
137
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Asquith, 3 October 2005,
‘Overture
from Muqtada al-Sadr’ and attachment including manuscript comment
Asquith.
537