The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
262.
In a statement
to Parliament at the end of April, Mr Hoon announced
that:
“Decisive
combat operations in Iraq are now complete, and Coalition forces
are
increasingly
focusing upon stabilisation tasks. It will therefore be possible to
make
further
force level adjustments over the coming weeks while continuing to
meet our
responsibilities
to the Iraqi people.”144
263.
In addition to
the substantial withdrawal of Royal Navy and Royal Air
Force
personnel
and many of the Army war-fighting units, Mr Hoon explained that he
had
extended
the tour of one unit to enable it “to continue in their key role of
ensuring
security in
the region of Az Zubayr”. He concluded that:
“While
details continue to be clarified, we envisage that by mid-May
25,000-30,000
UK Service
personnel will remain deployed in the Gulf region, continuing to
fulfil our
responsibilities
towards the Iraqi people. The planned replacement of forces is
clear
evidence of
our commitment to them.
“Our aim is
to leave an Iraq that is confident, secure and fully integrated
with the
international
community. The planning process to establish the precise level
of
the
continuing UK presence needed to achieve this aim is a dynamic one,
and
is kept
under review. We will also need to take account of the
contributions of
Coalition
partners. We will continue to withdraw assets and personnel from
the
region
where possible, but we will maintain an appropriate military
presence for
as long as
necessary.”
264.
Mr Straw, Sir
David Manning and Foreign Office officials discussed the
draft
post‑conflict
resolution by video conference with Secretary Powell and Dr Rice
on
265.
It was agreed
that the text:
•
should
recognise the Coalition as Occupying Powers, but not endorse
military
action
after the fact;
•
should
reiterate President Bush’s commitment to a vital role for the UN;
and
•
need not
make reference to UNMOVIC, which could be added later as part
of
the
negotiation process.
266.
The US and UK
held different views on:
•
whether the
UN Special Co-ordinator should lead the formation of the IIA;
and
•
whether the
UN or the CPA should have control of oil revenue, and for how
long
the OFF
programme should continue.
144
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 30 April
2003, columns 15-16WS.
145
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 30 April 2003, ‘Iraq/UN: Video-conference with
Condi Rice and
Colin Powell,
30 April’.
174