The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
security
situation on the ground and the level of capability of Iraqi Army
and Police
forces.”
380.
Sir Nigel
judged that:
“The
US
decision to put
extra combat forces into Baghdad could have
repercussions
in Basra. If, for example, there are major operations in Sadr
City,
the JAM
will react badly in Baghdad and possibly in Basra. This could lead
to a
deterioration
in the security situation in Basra just as we are trying to
re‑posture.
It could
at the very least delay our plans. This is one of the reasons why
the UK
Chiefs of
Staff are so nervous about US plans, but it is not the only one:
their
main
concern is that this surge will simply be a re‑run of the first two
phases of the
Baghdad
security plan.”
381.
Sir Nigel
attached a Cabinet Office note on Basra which he described
as
suggesting
“a pretty patchy picture”.
382.
The note said
that 14 of the 16 planned “pulses” in Op SINBAD had taken
place
so far.
There had been some successes but there were concerns about
relations with
the Basra
Security Committee, about the capacity of the Iraqi Army 10th
Division, whose
performance
had been “mixed”, and about the return of militia control in
particular areas.
383.
The Cabinet
Office reported that: “Despite these problems, MOD still assesses
that
we are on
track to achieve Provincial Iraqi Control in Basra in May 2007.”
Beside this,
Mr Blair
wrote:
“But how
can we do this if we have not secured Basra?”
384.
The Cabinet
Office note concluded with a reminder of the importance of
explaining
the UK’s
transition strategy effectively to the US, the Iraqis and other key
allies, noting
that “some
suspect … us of pursuing our own agenda or wanting to withdraw as
quickly
as
possible”. The Cabinet Office considered:
“Although
the potential surge in US forces in Baghdad presents an optical
problem
for both
the UK and US, this can be explained by pointing out that
Operation
SINBAD was
the equivalent UK surge, taking place in Basra sooner because of
the
different
security situation there.”
385.
Mr Blair
wrote on the document:
“But the
issue is not UK withdrawing troops and the US increasing them; it
is
whether in
Basra the conditions for draw‑down have been met.”
386.
Sir Nigel also
supplied Mr Blair with a minute setting out key points in
preparation
for a call
with President Bush.211
211
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with President Bush’.
72