9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
350.
The AHMGIR
also endorsed Sir Hilary’s plan for essential services and stated
that
it should
be taken forward urgently.
351.
A US draft of
the proposed Security Council resolution was also provided to
the
meeting.
Mr Straw explained that it “included a timetable for the
transfer of sovereignty,
expanding
the United Nations role and calling for a multi-national force
under unified
command”.
Mr Straw expected that the French and German governments
would
be “constructive”.
352.
The AHMGIR was
also made aware of a new senior officials group on Iraq,
chaired
by Sir
Nigel Sheinwald, that would meet twice weekly. This group was known
as the Iraq
Senior
Officials Group (ISOG).
353.
Mr Hilary
Benn wrote to Mr Blair on 4 September to explain that he had
approved
£20m of
DFID funding in support of the essential services plan. The balance
would need
to come
from the CPA in Baghdad. Mr Benn explained that he
had:
“… held
back from committing to meet the full cost, to avoid giving the
impression
to the CPA
that HMG wants to take on full responsibility for the south of the
country
including
the future funding of all infrastructure.”211
354.
RAND reported
that, in early September, Ambassador Bremer published a plan
for
the
restoration of Iraqi sovereignty.212
The steps
described by the plan were:
(i) the
creation of the GC;
(ii) the
formation of the Constitutional Preparatory Committee (CPC) to
propose
how to
write the Constitution;
(iii)
increasing day-to-day responsibility of the GC;
(iv)
writing the Constitution;
(v)
ratifying the document;
(vi)
national elections to choose a government; and
(vii) the
dissolution of the CPA and the resumption of Iraqi
sovereignty.
355.
This ‘Seven
Step Plan’ did not include a timescale.
356.
On 4
September, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary sent a paper
to Mr Cannon
to update
Mr Blair on “the political process, including the possibility
of an accelerated
transfer of
sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government”.213
211
Letter Benn
to Blair, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Restoring Essential Services in
the South’.
212
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
213
Letter
Adams to Cannon, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for the Prime
Minister’ attaching Paper,
‘Political
Process’.
267