The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
830.
A military
timetable should not be allowed to dictate a diplomatic
timetable.
If a strategy
of coercive diplomacy is being pursued, forces should be deployed
in
such a way
that the threat of action can be increased or decreased according
to the
diplomatic
situation and the policy can be sustained for as long as
necessary.
831.
The issue of
influencing the US, both at the strategic and at the operational
level,
was a
constant preoccupation at all levels of the UK
Government.
832.
Prime
Ministers will always wish to exercise their own political
judgement on
how to
handle the relationship with the US. It will depend on personal
relationships as
well as on
the nature of the issues being addressed. On all these matters of
strategy
and
diplomacy, the Inquiry recognises that there is no standard formula
that will be
appropriate
in all cases.
833.
Whether or not
influence has been exercised can be difficult to ascertain,
even
in
retrospect. The views of allies are most likely to make a
difference when they come
in one side
of an internal debate, and there are a number of instances where
the UK
arguments
did make a difference to the formation and implementation of US
policy.
The US
and UK are close allies, but the relationship between the two is
unequal.
834.
The exercise
of influence will always involve a combination of identifying
the
prerequisites
for success in a shared endeavour, and a degree of bargaining to
make
sure that
the approach meets the national interest. In situations like the
run‑up to the
invasion of
Iraq:
•
If certain
measures are identified as prerequisite for success then
their
importance
should be underlined from the start. There are no prizes for
sharing
a
failure.
•
Those
measures that are most important should be pursued persistently
and
consistently.
•
If it is
assumed that a consequence of making a contribution in one area
is
that a further
contribution would not be required in another, then that should
be
made
explicit.
•
Influence
should not be set as an objective in itself. The exercise of
influence is
a means to
an end.
835.
There will
continue to be demands for factual evidence to explain the
background
to
controversial policy decisions including, where appropriate, the
explicit and public use
of assessed
intelligence.
836.
The Inquiry
shares the Butler Review’s conclusions that it was a mistake not
to
see the
risk of combining in the September dossier the JIC’s assessment of
intelligence
and other
evidence with the interpretation and presentation of the evidence
in order to
make the
case for policy action.
130