9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
In August
2007, General Jack Keane, a retired US General who had just
returned
from Iraq,
was quoted in the media saying that UK “disengagement” from
southern
Iraq was
“worsening the security situation and fuelling frustration among
American
commanders.”109,110
He
commented that the UK had “never had enough troops to
truly
protect the
population” and described Basra as “almost gangland
warfare”.
Gen Keane’s
comments were described by The
Guardian as “the
latest in a series of
critical
comments made by US officials, many anonymously, about Britain’s
commitment
to Iraq”.
They included a warning from academic and columnist Dr Stephen
Biddle that the
UK would
have to fight its way out of Iraq in an “ugly and embarrassing
retreat”.
248.
In his weekly
update on 22 August, Maj Gen Binns wrote that he was picking
up
“a mild
suspicion in Baghdad over our CONOPs [concept of operations] post
PIC and
Basra
Palace”.111
He felt
that:
“We have a
robust plan engaging in capacity building/SSR with the ISF
and
engagement
with Key Leaders, having an effect on smuggling over the
borders …
extending
Governance, infrastructure and the economy through the
Provincial
Reconstruction
Teams, Civil Affairs and the development of Basra
International
Airport
…”
249.
On 23 August,
Mr Day wrote to Ms Aldred to follow up a conversation about
“the
PM’s
concern about the capacity and will of the Iraqi Palace Protection
Force to secure
the Basra
Palace compound up to Petraeus/Crocker and then to
PIC”.112
250.
Having briefed
Maj Gen Binns that Mr Brown “wants to be assured that
decisions
will be
taken on the basis of an honest appraisal of PPF capabilities”,
Mr Day reported
that the
collective view of those in Iraq, PJHQ and the MOD was that the
Palace
Protection
Force would be “as well-trained and equipped as it can make them”
and that
mentoring
would continue after the transfer. Maj Gen Binns would keep the
situation
under
review and would retain the option of delaying
transfer.
251.
On 23 August,
the Assessments Staff updated Ms Aldred that the level of
daily
attacks in
Iraq was broadly unchanged.113
In Basra,
rocket and mortar attacks had
declined
the previous week, though it was not possible to be sure of the
cause. The
Assessments
Staff reported on the likelihood that the agreement between MND(SE)
and
JAM in
Basra would succeed, but that a period of violent score-settling
would follow the
withdrawal
of UK troops from Basra.
109
The
Guardian, 24 August
2007, British
troops on verge of long-awaited pullout from Basra.
110
The
Guardian, 22 August
2007, US general
questions British tactics in Iraq.
111 Minute
Binns to CJO, 22 August, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
22 August 2007’.
112
Letter Day
to Aldred, 23 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra Palace’.
113
Minute
Dowse to Aldred, 23 August 2007, ‘Iraq Intelligence Update – 23
August 2007’.
229