9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
26.
Lt Gen Lamb
was reported to be concerned that “we might be giving up
broader
strategic
interests for the future of Basra” and that this would be seen as
“a hollow
victory,
gained for fixed British rather than strategic interests”. He
therefore suggested
either
holding the submission back and continuing discussions with JAM1 to
better
define the
options, or re-writing it to focus on broaching the issue with the
US and Iraqi
Government
as an initial objective.
27.
The official
concluded:
“In sum,
both HMA and SBMR-I believe the deal struck needs to be tougher;
that
it is not
clear to them to what extent control of Basra will be handed over
to JAM;
that there
will be serious reservations over the release of ‘red’ detainees
without a
better deal
being struck, and that neither [General David] PETRAEUS
[Commanding
General
MNF-I] or the GoI will agree to the proposal as it currently
stands.”
28.
On 3 July,
Mr Simon McDonald, Mr Brown’s Foreign Policy Adviser,
spoke to
Mr Stephen
Hadley, the US National Security Advisor, by
telephone.16
Mr McDonald
said
that
Mr Brown’s “analysis of the situation on the ground would be
tough; he was likely to
stress the
importance of Maliki and his government improving their
performance”.
29.
Air Marshal
Stuart Peach, Chief of Defence Intelligence, briefed the Chiefs of
Staff
on 3 July
that it was “unlikely that ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] would have
sufficient
capacity to
assume responsibility for security across Iraq by February 2008,
in
accordance
with current plans”.17
30.
Mr Brown’s
Private Secretary advised the Iraq Senior Officials Group on 3
July
that he had
“indicated that he would stick broadly to the strategy outlined by
Mr Blair
in
February”, but was keen that there should not be a significant gap
between the
handover of
Basra Palace and transition to PIC.18
Mr Brown
was currently occupied with
domestic
and counter-terrorism issues but would address strategies for both
Iraq and
Afghanistan soon.
31.
Mr Brown
told the Inquiry that his focus was on the area of Iraq for which
the UK
was
responsible:
“… my
determination was that we created the context in which Iraqis, that
is the
people of
Basra, had more control over their own affairs. So we had to build
up the
training of
the Iraqi forces and the training of the Iraqi police, and we did
that …
“Then we
had to make sure that local government elections took place, so
that
there was
some stability … And then we had to do something about
economic
development
… So through … 2007 … we were planning what we called
‘overwatch’,
where we would move from what was called ‘tactical
overwatch’,
16
Letter
McDonald to Hayes, 3 July 2007, ‘Conversation with US National
Security Adviser’.
17
Minutes, 3
July 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
18
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 3 July 2007, ‘Iraq
Senior Officials Group’.
187