3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
636.
Mr Paul
Heinbecker, Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN, stated
that,
since the
withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, there had been “no proof” that
Iraq had rid
itself of
WMD. There were reasons to believe the opposite was the case.
Recent Iraqi
co-operation
had only come in response to intense international pressure. More
time
for
inspectors could be useful, but only if Iraq decided to co-operate
“fully, actively and
transparently,
beginning now”.
637.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that the debate had been a “necessary
exercise”
which had
been organised by Germany (as President of the
Council).174
“Almost
all”
Member
States who had spoken “expressed a preference for a peaceful
outcome,
but almost
all stressed the need for better Iraqi compliance”.
When
Mr Blair met Mr Thabo Mbeki, the South African President,
at Chequers
on 1 February,
they had three hours of private talks.175
On Iraq,
the readout from the discussions was that Mr Blair had
“debriefed” Mr Mbeki
on his
talks with Washington and set out the UK position “in normal
terms”. Mr Mbeki told
Mr Blair
that Mr Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, “had
asked South Africa to
send a team
to Iraq to advise on how disarmament should be done”. Mr Blair
“commented
that there
was not much doubt about what Iraq should do”.
Mr Aziz
Pahad, the South African Deputy Foreign Minister, told the British
High
Commission
that, following his visit to Baghdad from 9 to 13 February, where
he had had
meetings
with Saddam Hussein, Mr Tariq Aziz and others, South Africa
would be sending
a team of
apartheid-era scientists to advise Iraq on
disarmament.176
Mr Pahad
said that he had delivered the message that Iraq must comply fully
with
resolution
1441, and the time for compliance was running out. Subsequently he
added
that he had
urged full rather than partial co-operation; this was “an all or
nothing” decision.
Mr Pahad’s
assessment was reported to be that:
•
Iraqi
attitudes were slowly shifting;
•
the inspectors
to whom he had spoken had noticed and reported this
mood
change;
•
those in
favour of co-operation might be “winning out”; and
•
the resolution
of the U2 over flights issue was “major progress”.
Mr Pahad
said South Africa’s objective was to prevent war by ensuring the
success of
weapons
inspections. A team of experts would be sent to Iraq “imminently”.
They would
not have
direct contact with the UN inspectors, “but would be proactive in
helping Iraq
to co-operate
and demonstrate this co-operation”.
174
Telegram
280 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Security
Council Open
Debate,
18/19 February’.
175
Letter
Lloyd to Davies, 1 February 2003, ‘Prime Minister and President
Mbeki at Chequers:
1 February 2003’.
176
Telegram 42
Pretoria Capetown to FCO London, 18 February 2003, ‘South
Africa/Iraq: Pahad Returns
from
Baghdad’.
293