The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Any
acquisition of long range missiles “would significantly increase
Saddam’s
threat to
the region and could, in the longer term, become a threat to the
UK
and US”.
•
In the
absence of the UN monitors, Iraq had “increased
the pace and scope of
its missile
programmes”.
•
The
programmes were “at an early stage of development” and, while
the
embargo
remained effective, it was “improbable
that Iraq could
produce an
operational
long range capability”.
•
The JIC
knew that Iraq had “retained key components of
disassembled
650km range
Al Hussein missiles. Recent
intelligence suggests that they
may
have assembled
up to 20 of these missiles.”
•
Iraq had
used its permitted programmes “to develop the expertise it acquired
on
longer
range systems before the Gulf War”.
•
Intelligence
indicated that “Iraq may be
working on a two stage solid
propellant
missile capable of delivering a payload to a range of
some 2000km.
•
Iraq had
“yet to develop successfully even its current short range solid
propellant
system”.
•
The JIC
assessed that “Were
sanctions lifted …
Iraq could
produce a missile
that could
reach Europe, and
possibly the UK within
about six years and
one capable of
reaching the US within ten years.” Those
timeframes “could
be
shortened if Iraq received significant external assistance or was
able to buy
North
Korean missile kits”.
•
Iraq was
“technically capable of arming a missile with a conventional,
chemical
or
biological warhead”.
•
The JIC
judged it would take Iraq “at least seven years after the lifting
of
sanctions
to produce
a nuclear warhead”.
•
The JIC
could not yet “assess” what the payload would need to be for a
nuclear
warhead on
a missile which would be able to reach the UK, or whether
Iraq
would “be
able to develop the 500kg nuclear payload needed [for a missile]
to
reach the
US in that time”.
51.
The Butler
Report stated that the JIC appeared to have based its judgement
about
Iraq’s
possession of Al Hussein missiles on its long-standing view on
Iraq’s concealment
activities
and three pieces of intelligence from three separate
sources.22
The figure
of
“up to 20”
missiles, which was used in all subsequent JIC Assessments and
Government
statements,
was provided by one of those sources who was in a position to
report
authoritatively
and reported reliably. He was, however, passing on the comments of
a
22
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
250.
22