Executive Summary

348. The warning about the risk of chemical and biological weapons becoming available

to extremist groups as a result of military action in Iraq was reiterated on 19 March.162

349. Addressing the JIC Assessment of 10 February 2003, Mr Blair told the Intelligence

and Security Committee (ISC) later that year that:

“One of the most difficult aspects of this is that there was obviously a danger that

in attacking Iraq you ended up provoking the very thing you were trying to avoid.

On the other hand I think you had to ask the question, ‘Could you really, as a

result of that fear, leave the possibility that in time developed into a nexus between

terrorism and WMD in an event?’ This is where you’ve just got to make your

judgement about this. But this is my judgement and it remains my judgement

and I suppose time will tell whether it’s true or it’s not true.”163

350. In its response to the ISC Report, the Government drew:

“... attention to the difficult judgement that had to be made and the factors on both

sides of the argument to be taken into account.”164

351. Baroness Manningham‑Buller told the Inquiry:

“By 2003/2004 we were receiving an increasing number of leads to terrorist activity

from within the UK ... our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word ...

a few among a generation ... [who] saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our

involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam.”165

352. Asked about the proposition that it was right to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime

to forestall a fusion of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism at

some point in the future, and if it had eliminated a threat of terrorism from his regime,

Baroness Manningham‑Buller replied:

“It eliminated the threat of terrorism from his direct regime; it didn’t eliminate the

threat of terrorism using unconventional methods ... So using weapons of mass

destruction as a terrorist weapon is still a potential threat.

“After all Usama Bin Laden said it was the duty of members of his organisation

or those in sympathy with it to acquire and use these weapons. It is interesting

that ... such efforts as we have seen to get access to these sort of materials have

been low‑grade and not very professional, but it must be a cause of concern to my

former colleagues that at some stage terrorist groups will resort to these methods.

162 Note JIC, 19 March 2003, ‘Saddam: The Beginning of the End’.

163 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and

Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 128.

164 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass

Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, 11 September 2003, February 2004, Cm6118, paragraph 22.

165 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 19.

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