13.1 |
Resources
313.
PJHQ had also
assumed that DFID would be responsible for providing
“national
humanitarian
assistance”. It was now clear that the UK military would be unable
to
rely on
“DFID support for UK troops”. Dr Brewer’s letter of 24
February to Mr Bowen
had implied
that DFID would not provide funding to the UK military for
humanitarian
operations
without a second UN resolution. Even if there was a second
resolution,
DFID’s
commitment to supporting UN agencies at a national level would
constrain what
DFID would
do in the UK’s AO with the UK military and other partners.
DFID’s view
was that
the most effective way to distribute humanitarian assistance was
through
international
organisations and NGOs, and DFID intended to focus its resources
on
areas of
greatest need (rather than necessarily on the UK’s
AO).
314.
PJHQ estimated
that between £30m and £50m a month for two months
would
be required
to cover the provision of humanitarian assistance in the UK’s AO in
the
immediate
aftermath of any conflict.
315.
An MOD
official submitted advice on the issue to Mr Hoon on 7
March.185
The official
rehearsed the background set out in PJHQ’s note of 5 March, but
suggested
that only
£10m a month would be required:
“… DFID
have only just engaged on this issue in detail, [and] it has not
been
possible to
get their expert advice on what might be required … That said,
the
current
working assumption is that there will be a particular requirement
for supplies
of
drinkable water, medical supplies and fuel … It has been suggested
that the total
requirement
could amount to as much as £10m a month …”
316.
Two camps for
internally displaced persons might also be required, at a
“one‑off”
cost of
£10m each.
317.
The official
provided a draft letter for Mr Hoon to send to Ms Short,
seeking her
agreement
“to channel aid – funds – through our forces”. That agreement was
needed
urgently to
ensure supplies could be procured and delivered on
time.
318.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Ms Short on the same day, seeking her agreement
that
“an approach
is made to the Chief Secretary” for funding as a matter of
urgency.186
319.
Ms Short
replied on 12 March, agreeing that Mr Hoon should urgently
discuss
funding
with the Treasury.187
She added
that DFID would not be able to inherit the
“indefinite
obligation” to spend £10m a month from the military without
adequate finance
to cover
it. Copies of Mr Hoon’s and Ms Short’s letters were sent
to Mr Brown.
320.
Ms Short
wrote to Mr Blair on the same day, setting out her misgivings
about the
state of
humanitarian planning; copies of her letter were sent to
Mr Hoon, Mr Straw,
185
Minute MOD
D/Sec to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 March 2003, ‘OP Telic: DFID
Involvement and
the Funding
of Immediate Humanitarian Assistance’.
186
Letter Hoon
to Short, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Immediate Humanitarian
Assistance’.
187
Letter
Short to Hoon, 12 March 2003, [untitled].
495