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13.1  |  Resources
313.  PJHQ had also assumed that DFID would be responsible for providing “national
humanitarian assistance”. It was now clear that the UK military would be unable to
rely on “DFID support for UK troops”. Dr Brewer’s letter of 24 February to Mr Bowen
had implied that DFID would not provide funding to the UK military for humanitarian
operations without a second UN resolution. Even if there was a second resolution,
DFID’s commitment to supporting UN agencies at a national level would constrain what
DFID would do in the UK’s AO with the UK military and other partners. DFID’s view
was that the most effective way to distribute humanitarian assistance was through
international organisations and NGOs, and DFID intended to focus its resources on
areas of greatest need (rather than necessarily on the UK’s AO).
314.  PJHQ estimated that between £30m and £50m a month for two months would
be required to cover the provision of humanitarian assistance in the UK’s AO in the
immediate aftermath of any conflict.
315.  An MOD official submitted advice on the issue to Mr Hoon on 7 March.185
The official rehearsed the background set out in PJHQ’s note of 5 March, but suggested
that only £10m a month would be required:
“… DFID have only just engaged on this issue in detail, [and] it has not been
possible to get their expert advice on what might be required … That said, the
current working assumption is that there will be a particular requirement for supplies
of drinkable water, medical supplies and fuel … It has been suggested that the total
requirement could amount to as much as £10m a month …”
316.  Two camps for internally displaced persons might also be required, at a “one‑off”
cost of £10m each.
317.  The official provided a draft letter for Mr Hoon to send to Ms Short, seeking her
agreement “to channel aid – funds – through our forces”. That agreement was needed
urgently to ensure supplies could be procured and delivered on time.
318.  Mr Hoon wrote to Ms Short on the same day, seeking her agreement that
“an approach is made to the Chief Secretary” for funding as a matter of urgency.186
319.  Ms Short replied on 12 March, agreeing that Mr Hoon should urgently discuss
funding with the Treasury.187 She added that DFID would not be able to inherit the
“indefinite obligation” to spend £10m a month from the military without adequate finance
to cover it. Copies of Mr Hoon’s and Ms Short’s letters were sent to Mr Brown.
320.  Ms Short wrote to Mr Blair on the same day, setting out her misgivings about the
state of humanitarian planning; copies of her letter were sent to Mr Hoon, Mr Straw,
185 Minute MOD D/Sec to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 March 2003, ‘OP Telic: DFID Involvement and
the Funding of Immediate Humanitarian Assistance’.
186 Letter Hoon to Short, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Immediate Humanitarian Assistance’.
187 Letter Short to Hoon, 12 March 2003, [untitled].
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