4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
•
The JIC
assessed that those quantities of agent “could produce
significant
casualties”.
30.
The Assessment
stated:
“Iraq
seems to be exploring the use of mobile facilities to give its
biological
warfare
activities greater security. The Iraqis had
mobile … facilities for filling
chemical
weapons at the time of the Gulf War. We know that senior Iraqis
have
told UNSCOM
that the use of mobile facilities was considered during the
planning
of their
one dedicated BW facility. But we have no other evidence for BW
mobile
production
centres. We judge that it would be technically feasible for Iraq to
produce
20-30
tonnes of … BW agent … We have no evidence for Iraq filling weapons
with
biological
agent since the Gulf War. But for practical reasons, advance
stockpiling of
some BW
agents is less likely than for CW agents.
“In the
light of this and other evidence of Iraqi illicit procurement of
dual use
equipment
and materials, we judge that Iraq is likely to be continuing to
develop its
BW
capabilities.”
31.
The Butler
Report stated that the Key Judgement on Iraq’s biological
warfare
activities
was based on two new strands of evidence, and was somewhat
more
firmly
expressed than the subsequent analysis in the Assessment might
bear.
32.
Considering
the Assessment in 2004, the Butler Report stated that the
firmer
assessment
(that there was “clear evidence” of continuing BW activity) in
the
Key Judgement:
“… was
based on two new strands of evidence. The first was intelligence
reports on
aspects of
Iraqi research and development activities in 1997/1998. The second,
and
more
significant, was new intelligence from a liaison service received a
few days
before the
production of the JIC Assessment on the use by Iraq of mobile
facilities to
produce
biological agent.”
33.
The Butler
Report stated that the language in the Assessment on
mobile
laboratories:
“… was
appropriate for a new source whose reporting had not by then
been
validated
although the Key Judgement was somewhat more firmly expressed
than
the
subsequent analysis in the Assessment might bear.”10
34.
Sir John
Scarlett, Chairman of the JIC from September 2001 to July 2004,
told the
Inquiry
that the first report on mobile laboratories came through “in early
2000” and was
“reflected
… if only briefly” in the Assessment in April 2000.11
10
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
239.
11
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 17.
15