The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
524.
Dr Brewer set
out DFID’s approach to humanitarian planning. The UK was
“well
placed to
play an exemplary role in humanitarian support in the UK AOR but
saw UN
authorisation
as essential to effective involvement”. DFID had identified four
potentially
complementary
routes for delivering support (through UN agencies, the US
military, UK
military
and DFID bilaterally), subject to five possible scenarios ranging
from no UNSCR
to an “all
embracing UN mandate”. At the two extremes, it would only be
“politically
possible”
to provide a small amount of assistance without a second
resolution, while a
“full UN
mandate” would require funding of £300m-£400m per year. Training
for a small
number of
DFID staff had begun, but their deployment would depend on progress
at the
UN. Ms
Short, while working for full commitment through the UN, would not
be seeking
additional
resources beyond DFID’s £100m contingency reserve.
525.
Dr Brewer
restated DFID’s position in a letter to Mr Bowen on 24
February, which
was copied
to the MOD, FCO and Treasury.
526.
The Chiefs of
Staff agreed that humanitarian operations formed an essential
part
of the
overall campaign, not least as a force protection measure, and
should therefore
attract
Treasury contingency funding. Adm Boyce directed that humanitarian
assistance
be covered
in the joint FCO/MOD position paper on post-conflict issues for the
Rock
Drill,
which should make clear the potential for conflict and
post-conflict phases to run
in parallel
from an early stage.
527.
Adm Boyce
summarised the key points of the discussion on
post-conflict
preparations,
including that:
•
the Rock
Drill should be used “to secure maximum [UK] influence without
early
commitment
to detail”;
•
a
“UN-approved international civilian administrator” would be
required;
•
UK Phase IV
activity should centre on the region around Basra; and
•
the UK
military commitment should be “scaled down from large to medium in
the
528.
On 20
February, Mr Chilcott sent Mr Straw an IPU guidance note
for officials taking
part in the
Rock Drill.224
It had been
agreed with Mr Ehrman, the MOD and the Cabinet
Office, but
not DFID.
529.
Mr Chilcott’s
covering minute to Mr Straw stated:
“There is
barely any mention of the UN in the CENTCOM plans we have seen
for
Phase IV
(post-conflict) to date. But there are gaps in the plan, which is
still fluid and
which we
have the opportunity to influence. We shall encourage the US
players at
223
The only
reference to reducing troop numbers “in the autumn” seen by the
Inquiry. All subsequent
references
are to a reduction “by the autumn”.
224
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day-After (Phase IV)’ attaching
Paper
[unattributed], ‘Iraq Day After: Guidance for Officials at US ROCK
Drill’.
402