The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
404.
Adm Boyce
stated that “the provision of correctly fitted respirators
continued to
cause him
considerable concern”.
405.
Maj Gen Fry
reported that “there would be as few as 200 personnel who could
not
satisfactorily
be protected through existing arrangements”. Relocating those
individuals
“could
ameliorate the problem, but there was a presentational
issue”.
406.
ACM Bagnall
was directed to lead on the issues and to ensure that
Mr Tony
Pawson, MOD
Director General Corporate Communications, was
engaged.
407.
RAdm Style
wrote to ACM Bagnall later that day reporting:
“Sufficient
equipment (the Respirator Test System and additional Respirators)
and
necessary
support are available … DCJO(Ops) has reported that he anticipates
the
majority of
testing to be complete by about 10 March. I shall seek
confirmation of
their
arrival and the expected testing timetable in time for Friday’s
Ministerial brief.”197
408.
ACM Bagnall
wrote to the Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC),
explaining
that he was
progressing the respirator issues as “a matter of urgency” but
there was
also a need
to note the CBRN shortfalls in the wider Operation TELIC lesson
process
to “be
clear about why we have got into this situation”.198
He raised
several questions to
illustrate
his point including:
•
“who is
responsible for what aspects of the CBRN defence spectrum”;
and
•
“who is
responsible for ensuring that individual units, ships etc are in
date and
properly
equipped to operate in an NBC environment?”
409.
A paper was
circulated to the Chiefs of Staff on 7 March about respirator
fit testing
by the DJW,
highlighting that it had raised issues “both in policy terms and
dealing with
the impact
on the individual as the results are exposed”.199
410.
The DJW
recommended the Chiefs of Staff agree that:
•
Individuals
who did not attain an optimum fit after testing were provided with
the
respirator
that afforded “the best attainable level of protection, i.e.
‘best
fit’”.
•
Solutions
for the residual 0.5 percent of individuals were being
pursued:
“At this
stage it is impossible to predict whether a solution will be found
in the
time
available.”
•
Advice to
the Combined Joint Task Force should be “that individuals who
cannot
achieve an
optimum fit should, where possible, only be deployed in areas
where
the NBC
risk is assessed as lower”.
197
Minute
Style to MA/VCDS, 5 March 2003, ‘NBC
Respirators’.
198
Minute VCDS
to DOC, 5 March 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – CBRN Lessons Learned’
attaching Minute
Howard to
PS/Min(DP), ‘Presentation Aspects of CBRN’.
199
Minute DJW
and D CBW POL to COSSEC, 7 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC – NBC
Respirator Best Fit
Policy’.
64