14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
731.
One of the
points the Chiefs of Staff were asked to note was that, while the
UK had
“a first
class capability to neutralise and mitigate the IED threat”,
“significant continued
investment”
was necessary “to keep pace” with its rapid development. The
review
stated:
“Physical protection levels against the more capable anti‑armour
IEDs are,
however,
probably approaching engineering and material limits.”
732.
On protected
mobility, the review stated:
“The
commander needs a range of protected vehicles to provide different
levels of
protection
and mobility depending on the specific operation. This includes the
need
to operate
in urban areas where larger, tracked vehicles may not be able to
enter.”
733.
The review
stated that, while the Snatch Land Rovers had been upgraded,
they
were “still
very vulnerable to roadside bombs and RPG”.
734.
The review
stated that “the need for a replacement wheeled protected
vehicle
was previously
identified and Vector … PPV was procured with money being
pulled
forward
from the programme that already sat within the EP. Vector delivers
increased
protection
and greater capacity in comparison to Snatch and a total of 166
vehicles
have been
procured.” There were 34 vehicles in Afghanistan and 22 in the
training fleet;
the
remaining 110 were due to be delivered by 31 October
2007.
735.
The review
also referred to Mastiff’s rapid procurement and said that early
reports
suggested
it was “performing well”.
736.
There was
“still no clearly defined Theatre Entry Standard for minimum
levels
of
protection and equipment that must be fitted to all vehicles” and
that “an overall
assessment
of the protection levels” would be “appropriate”.
737.
The Chiefs of
Staff endorsed the recommendations on 26 September,
including
the need to
understand and articulate the level of risk that was acceptable on
any
738.
As a result of
the DOC audit, the MOD produced a force protection policy
in
November
2007.397
It
stated:
“The
central tenet of this Force Protection (FP) policy is that the
application of FP
measures to
achieve a tolerable level of risk … enables, rather than
constrains,
our freedom
of manoeuvre.”
739.
In the policy
document, the MOD mandated “the employment of a standard
risk
methodology
across all activities to ensure a common approach to the
implementation
of FP
[Force Protection] measures”. Oversight across the department would
be achieved
through an
FP Co‑ordinating Committee (FPCC) chaired by Air Commodore Brian
Bates,
396
Minutes, 26
September 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
397
Paper MOD,
November 2007, ‘Policy for the Protection of UK
Forces’.
127