3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
65.
Mr Straw
stated that it was “clear that Iraq has failed” the second test.
The briefings
to the
Council had:
“…
confirmed our worst fears, that Iraq has no intention of
relinquishing its WMD,
no
intention of following the path of peaceful disarmament set out in
UNSCR [UN
Security
Council resolution] 1441. Instead of open admissions and
transparency,
we have a
charade, where a veneer of superficial co-operation masks
wilful
concealment,
the extent of which has been devastatingly revealed this
morning
by Secretary
Powell.”
66.
Mr Straw
stated that there was “only one possible conclusion … Iraq is in
further
material
breach” of resolution 1441. The Council faced a difficult choice.
It would be
“Easy but
wrong” to hope for a change of heart by Iraq. That would be
“repeating the
mistakes of
the last 12 years and empowering a dictator”.
67.
Commenting on
Secretary Powell’s description of reports about the presence in
Iraq
of “[Abu
Musab] al- Zarqawi [Leader of Al Qaida in Iraq], and other members
of Al Qaida,
and their
efforts to develop poisons”, Mr Straw stated that: “It defies
the imagination
that all of
this could be going on without the knowledge of Saddam Hussein. The
recent
discovery
of the poison ricin in London has underlined again that this is a
threat that all
of us
face.”
“… time is
now very short. The Council will have further reports from
the
inspectors on
… 14 February. If non-co-operation continues, the Council must
meet
its
responsibilities.
…
“This is a
moment of choice for Saddam and the Iraqi regime. But it is also
a
moment of
choice for … the United Nations … the League of Nations …
failed
because it
could not create actions … It could not back diplomacy with the
credible
threat and,
where necessary, the use of force … At each stage good men
said,
‘Wait. The
evil is not big enough to challenge’. Then before their eyes, the
evil
became too
big to challenge. We slipped slowly down a slope, never noticing
how
far we had
gone until it was too late. We owe it to our history, as well as
our future,
not to make
the same mistake again.”
69.
In response
to Secretary Powell’s presentation, most members of
Council
stated that
the information presented would require serious and thorough
study
and
encouraged Iraq to co-operate with the inspectors and provide
answers to
the outstanding
questions.
70.
Mr Igor
Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, stated that the information
Secretary
Powell had
provided required “very serious and thorough study”. It should be
handed
immediately
to UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for
on-site
191