6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
777.
On AM
Burridge’s authority outside the delegated limits, Lord Goldsmith
wrote
that Mr
Hoon had “not
delegated
authority” because effectively AM Burridge could not
proceed
without Mr Hoon’s approval. He added:
“It does
not seem entirely clear why you have not said this in terms,
particularly
given the
need for clarity in the scope of any delegation in order to protect
the
position of
the commander (which I emphasised in my earlier
advice).”
778.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that his understanding was that Mr Hoon would not seek
his
advice on
the lawfulness of the attack, given the time-sensitive nature of
such targets:
“This is a
matter for you. However, the judgement as to whether such attacks
are
lawful is
likely to be a very difficult one to make. You will therefore wish
to satisfy
yourself
that the legal position has been fully considered, bearing in mind
that you
could
ultimately be held legally responsible for any such
decision.”
779.
Mr Hoon
replied on 7 April, confirming that he had decided to continue with
the
delegations
as he had set out in his letter of 29 March but that he would keep
them
under
constant review.269
780.
Mr Hoon
confirmed that he appreciated the distinction between military
location
and
military objective, acknowledging that it could include dual-use
facilities. He
added that,
in deciding on the delegation for Category A targets, he had
considered
that any
high number of casualties at a military location “would be somewhat
less
controversial
than at any other sort of location”. He had hoped that this was in
keeping
with
Lord Goldsmith’s suggestion that he should consider placing
limitations on the
circumstances
in which attacks might be authorised by considering their
locations.
781.
Mr Hoon wrote
that the process whereby he could overrule AM
Burridge’s
decisions
was created because Mr Hoon could not take advice “in the normal
way in
the time
available”. He explained:
“… I can
overrule the National Contingent Commander’s decision, but I
cannot
take it for
him. Air Marshal Burridge only refers to me when he has
already decided
that he
believes an attack should go ahead, and that it would be lawful
based upon
the legal
advice available to him. As you are aware, we have already tested
this
mechanism
and Brian Burridge is in no doubt about the position: the decision
to
attack
remains his.”
782.
Mr Hoon
concluded that the position remained different for matters
outside
AM Burridge’s
other delegations. Those would continue to be referred to Mr Hoon
and
he would
take Lord Goldsmith’s advice in the normal way.
269
Letter Hoon
to Goldsmith, 7 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Targeting
Individuals’.
511