6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
•
pursuit of
growth-orientated economic policies with International Monetary
Fund
(IMF) and
World Bank support;
•
integration
into the region and an application to join the World
Trade
Organization
(WTO);
•
promotion of
investment in Iraq’s oil industry;
•
establishment
of a comprehensive retraining programme for Iraqi
professionals,
academic
exchanges and scholarships;
•
promotion of
an EU aid/trade package.
Many
elements of the ‘Contract’ were incorporated into the first draft
of the FCO’s
‘Vision for
Iraq and the Iraqi People’, produced in October 2002 and addressed
later in this
Section.
96.
On 3 December
2001, in response to a request from Mr Blair for “a note on
the
options for
dealing with Iraq”, Mr Simon McDonald, Principal Private Secretary
to
Mr Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, advised No.10 that:
“A strategy
to deal with a WMD threat will require ratcheting up our present
policy
of
containment … We should encourage and support the Iraqi opposition.
We could
mount a
higher profile campaign on the issue of war crimes and consider the
options
for an
international tribunal to try Saddam and his principal lieutenants.
We could set
out a
vision of post-Saddam Iraq by deploying a ‘Contract with the Iraqi
People’.”70
97.
The other
issues addressed in Mr McDonald’s letter are considered in Section
3.1.
98.
On 4 December,
Mr Blair sent President Bush a paper, ‘The War against
Terrorism:
The Second
Phase’, which was delivered by Sir David Manning (see Section
3.1).71
99.
The key points
relating to Iraq included the need for “a strategy for regime
change
which
builds over time” and might include supporting opposition groups,
and setting out
an agenda
for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq (the FCO’s ‘Contract with the Iraqi
People’).
100.
In December
2001, an attempt was made by a senior Republican close to
the
Pentagon to
persuade Mr Kevin Tebbit, MOD PUS, that the opposition Iraqi
National
Congress
(INC) could be a force to be reckoned with, “sufficient to cause an
Iraqi
response
and enable the US to take supportive military action” (see Section
3.1).72
101.
On 13
December, Mr Tebbit commissioned an analysis of that thesis, which
he
expected
would “show it to be flawed”.73
70
Letter
McDonald to Tatham, 3 December 2001, ‘Iraq: Options’ attaching
Paper, ‘Contract with the
Iraqi People’.
71
Note [Blair
to Bush], 4 December 2001, ‘The War against Terrorism: The Second
Phase’.
72
Minute
PS/PUS [MOD] to PS/CDI, 13 December 2001, ‘Iraq: is there a
‘Northern Alliance’?’
73
Minute
PS/PUS [MOD] to PS/CDI, 13 December 2001, ‘Iraq: is there a
‘Northern Alliance’?’
131