10.2 | Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

511. On 22 February, the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, the fourth most revered

shrine in Shia Islam and the only major Shia shrine under sole Sunni protection,

was bombed.292

512. Section 9.4 describes increasing concerns within the UK Government on the level

of sectarian violence in Iraq and the possibility of civil war.

513. On 15 March, at the request of the FCO and MOD, the JIC assessed the security

situation in southern Iraq.293

514. Key Judgements included:

“I. Levels of violence in southern Iraq are much lower than in Baghdad and Sunni

areas in the centre and north …

…

“III. Across the South, there is no strong administrative machinery to promote

security and stability. Government structures and capacity are fragile. The

lack of central authority has encouraged protracted, and occasionally violent,

local squabbles over power. Multiple sources of authority persist and carry

equal weight …”

DFID undertook an internal review of the performance and “value-for-money” of its

projects in Iraq in March 2006.294

The review’s main conclusions were:

• 71 percent of current, large (over £4m) projects in Iraq were “high risk”, compared

with just over 10 percent of DFID projects globally. Most projects were subject to

the same (political and security) risks, so scope to balance risk was limited.295

• Of the 14 current, large projects, nine were likely to completely or largely achieve

their objectives and five were likely to partly achieve their objectives or to achieve

their objectives only to a very limited extent.

• 44 percent of all DFID projects in Iraq had achieved or were likely to completely

or largely achieve their objectives, compared with 68 percent of DFID projects

globally.

• Many projects had benefits beyond their stated objectives, for example in terms

of setting policy agendas, leveraging in other donors’ resources, and “giving DFID

credibility to influence Whitehall”.

292 Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 23 February 2006, ‘Samarra Shrine Bombing – Background

and Update’.

293 JIC Assessment, 15 March 2006, ‘Iraq: the Security Situation in the South’.

294 Minute Hendrie to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 27 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Portfolio Quality Review’.

295 Not all the figures used in the text of the Portfolio Quality Review are consistent with the information

presented in the supporting graphs and table. Where there is inconsistency, the Inquiry has drawn

information directly from the supporting graphs and table.

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