6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

629. The JIC stated that it had “previously judged that Saddam would be willing to use

chemical and biological warfare (CBW) against the Coalition and the Iraqi population”.216

630. The JIC assessed that it was “likely that, even if it had not done so already, the

regime would use CBW in the defence of Baghdad if it could”. That “would depend on

the survival of leadership command and control, and of some delivery means, such as

artillery”. Intelligence indicated that the Special Republican Guard and Special Security

Organisation retained “control over CBW munitions” and that the regime had “been

distributing protective CBW clothing and medical supplies for treating exposure to nerve

agents to units around Baghdad”.

On 10 March, Mr Hoon was asked to agree two additional UK deployments:

• 1st Battalion The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, to guard Prisoners of War as

a consequence of the plan for UK units to provide “reliefs-in-place of US ground

forces”;217 and

• 202 Field Hospital (Volunteer), to increase the number of field hospitals from two to

three in response to concerns that the medical capability could be “overwhelmed

early in the course of operations”.218

Mr Hoon announced both deployments on 13 March, stating that they would provide

1 (UK) Div with “further flexibility to respond to a range of possible tasks and

circumstances”.219

631. Mr Blair agreed the military plan on 13 March.

632. Mr Blair held a further meeting to discuss the military plan and timetable with

Mr Prescott, Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce on 13 March.220 That discussed the

timing of the start of the military campaign and formal approval of the military plan set

out in Mr Watkins’ letter of 11 March.

633. There was “a discussion about the timing of the end of the UN process … and the

start of military action”. It was agreed that Mr Blair would pursue the timing issues with

President Bush.

216 Note JIC, 13 March 2003, ‘Saddam’s Plan for Baghdad’.

217 Minute Johnson to APS/SofS [MOD], 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Reinforcement of 1 (UK) Division for

Handling Prisoners of War’.

218 Minute Johnson to APS/SofS [MOD], 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Retention of a Third Field Hospital’.

219 House of Commons, Official Report, 13 March 2003, columns 19-20WS.

220 Letter Manning to Watkins, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military Plan’.

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