The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The assessed
intelligence had not
established
beyond doubt either that Saddam
Hussein had
continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that
efforts
to develop
nuclear weapons continued. The JIC should have made that
clear
to Mr Blair.
•
In his
statement to Parliament on 24 September Mr Blair presented
Iraq’s past,
current and
potential future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the
potential
threat from
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction; and that at some point in the
future
that threat
would become a reality.
•
The dossier’s
description of Iraq’s capabilities and intent became part of the
baseline
against
which the UK Government measured Iraq’s future statements and
actions
and the
success of weapons inspections.
•
The widespread
perception that the September 2002 dossier overstated the
firmness
of the
evidence has produced a damaging legacy which may make it more
difficult to
secure
support for Government policy, including military action, where the
evidence
depends on
inferential judgements drawn from intelligence.
•
There are
lessons which should be implemented in using information from
JIC
Assessments
to underpin policy decisions.
7.
Mr Blair’s
meeting on Iraq on 23 July did not take firm decisions
and
he commissioned
further advice and background material on the issues.
8.
On 23 July,
Mr Blair discussed Iraq with Mr Jack Straw (the Foreign
Secretary),
Mr Geoff
Hoon (the Defence Secretary), Lord Goldsmith (Attorney General),
Sir Richard
Wilson
(Cabinet Secretary), Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (Chief of the
Defence Staff
(CDS)),
Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS)), Sir
Francis
Richards (Head of the Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ)),
Mr John
Scarlett (Chairman of the JIC), Mr Jonathan Powell
(Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff),
Baroness
Morgan (Mr Blair’s Director of Political and Government
Relations), Mr Alastair
Campbell
(Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy) and Sir
David Manning
(Mr Blair’s
Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and
Defence
9.
The meeting
and the advice prepared for Mr Blair and other participants
are
addressed
in detail in Section 3.3.
10.
The Cabinet
Office paper, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’, which was
prepared
to inform
the discussion, was based on the assumption that Iraq was in
possession of
prohibited
weapons and material and was not complying with its UN obligations;
but
1
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
116