The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
793.
The MOD advice
to Mr Hoon stated:
“… any UK
involvement in the administration of post-conflict Iraq will
necessarily
require a
significant civilian administrative and specialist component; this
component
has not yet
been identified or resourced by OGDs. This is the
key issue.
The success
of civil administration will be essential to Iraq’s long term
future.
The UK
military cannot do this on their own.
“… [T]he
current defence planning assumption is that UK forces can only
sustain
large scale
operations for a period of six months without doing long term
damage
to capability.
This implies that UK forces reduce to a Medium Scale (i.e. roughly
one
brigade)
post-conflict TELIC commitment.
“… US
planning is currently tending to assume UK involvement in Phase IV
at a
level that
is the maximum, if not higher than, that we can sustain.
If
Ministers wish
to set
limits on the UK’s Phase IV contribution they should be set now so
that
US planning
can be adjusted …
“… [A]s US
planning stands, the UK will need substantial support from other
nations.
There are
no arrangements yet in place formally to gather such support.
Such
support
will be largely contingent on a suitable second/third UNSCR and a
UN
mandate for
the occupation of Iraq. The FCO need to build on their recent
‘market
survey’ to
identify candidates and persuade them to shorten the time it will
take them
794.
Possible
levels of UK commitment to Phase IV were set out in an
annex:
“i.
Maximum
payoff (and maximum cost): Tackle a
problem area (eg Basra) with
a UK
two-star lead (subsequently becoming a multinational HQ). A UK
Brigade
in the SE
sector. HQ ARRC taking on the CJTF(I) role early for six months.
UK
involvement
(but not military) in a reconstruction pillar. This would be
contingent
on US
burden sharing on HQ ARRC CIS [communications and
information
systems].
ii.
Regional
(+): The SE
Sector with a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming
a
multinational HQ). A UK Brigade in the SE sector. No HQ ARRC but
UK
involvement
(including military) in a reconstruction pillar and a significant
staff
contribution
to CJTF-I.
iii.
Regional:
The SE
Sector with a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming
a
multinational
HQ). A UK Brigade in the SE sector.
339
Minute
Sec(O)4 to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Aftermath – Medium to Long
Term UK
Military Commitment’.
454