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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
793.  The MOD advice to Mr Hoon stated:
“… any UK involvement in the administration of post-conflict Iraq will necessarily
require a significant civilian administrative and specialist component; this component
has not yet been identified or resourced by OGDs. This is the key issue.
The success of civil administration will be essential to Iraq’s long term future.
The UK military cannot do this on their own.
“… [T]he current defence planning assumption is that UK forces can only sustain
large scale operations for a period of six months without doing long term damage
to capability. This implies that UK forces reduce to a Medium Scale (i.e. roughly one
brigade) post-conflict TELIC commitment.
“… US planning is currently tending to assume UK involvement in Phase IV at a
level that is the maximum, if not higher than, that we can sustain. If Ministers wish
to set limits on the UK’s Phase IV contribution they should be set now so that
US planning can be adjusted
“… [A]s US planning stands, the UK will need substantial support from other nations.
There are no arrangements yet in place formally to gather such support. Such
support will be largely contingent on a suitable second/third UNSCR and a UN
mandate for the occupation of Iraq. The FCO need to build on their recent ‘market
survey’ to identify candidates and persuade them to shorten the time it will take them
to deploy.”339
794.  Possible levels of UK commitment to Phase IV were set out in an annex:
“i. Maximum payoff (and maximum cost): Tackle a problem area (eg Basra) with
a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming a multinational HQ). A UK Brigade
in the SE sector. HQ ARRC taking on the CJTF(I) role early for six months. UK
involvement (but not military) in a reconstruction pillar. This would be contingent
on US burden sharing on HQ ARRC CIS [communications and information
systems].
ii. Regional (+): The SE Sector with a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming
a multinational HQ). A UK Brigade in the SE sector. No HQ ARRC but UK
involvement (including military) in a reconstruction pillar and a significant staff
contribution to CJTF-I.
iii. Regional: The SE Sector with a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming a
multinational HQ). A UK Brigade in the SE sector.
339 Minute Sec(O)4 to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Aftermath – Medium to Long
Term UK Military Commitment’.
454
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