The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
728.
The FCO
reported that Mr Ivanov had stated that Russia wanted to
continue
working
under the aegis of the Security Council. The Council should discuss
Dr Blix’s
report,
which constituted a real action plan for Iraq’s disarmament, in its
meeting on
19 March.
He would attend that meeting. The Azores meeting represented the
views
of only
three states; it could not replace a Security Council meeting. No
single country
had the
right to stop the work of the weapons inspectors, whose authority
came from
the UN.
Recalling an assurance from Mr Blair to President Putin before
the adoption
of
resolution 1441 that it did not imply the automatic use of
force, Mr Ivanov stated
that
Russia’s main condition remained that the Security Council should
vote on any
resolution
sanctioning military action.
729.
At “about
3.15pm UK time” on 17 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
announced
that the
resolution would not be put to a vote, stating that the
co-sponsors
reserved
the right to take their own steps to secure the disarmament of
Iraq.
730.
At “about
3.15pm UK time”,253
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock made a statement
announcing
that the UK, the US and Spain, as co-sponsors of the draft
resolution,
would not
be pursuing a vote on it.254
“… we have
worked very hard in the last few days in a final effort to seek a
Council
consensus
on Iraq. In an effort to reunite the Council the United Kingdom
proposed
last week
an ultimatum which would challenge Iraq to take a strategic
decision
to disarm.
“There were
three key elements to the compromise we proposed …
“Having
held further discussions with Council Members over the weekend and
in the
last few
hours, we have had to conclude that Council consensus will not be
possible
… One
country in particular has underlined its intention to veto any
ultimatum ‘no
matter what
the circumstances’. That country rejected our proposed
compromise
before even
the Iraqi government itself and has put forward suggestions that
would
row back on
the unanimous agreement of the Council in 1441 – those
suggestions
would
amount to no ultimatum/no pressure/and no disarmament.
“The
communiqués and press statements that issued at the Azores Summit
explain
the
positions of our governments … The co-sponsors reserve their right
to take their
own steps
to secure the disarmament of Iraq.”
253
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, column 703.
254
Telegram
465 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution:
Statement’.
528