3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

625. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry that it was his “responsibility not to be

caught having allowed somebody to put down a resolution against us because I had

lost the initiative. I would have been criticised for that.”215

626. The FCO advice on setting out a “Vision” for Iraq after the conflict at the Azores

Summit is addressed in Section 6.5.

627. In his discussion with President Bush on 15 March, Mr Blair proposed that

the main message from the Azores Summit should be that it was the final chance

for Saddam Hussein to demonstrate that he had taken the strategic decision to

avert war; and that members of the Security Council should be able to sanction

the use of force as Iraq was in material breach of its obligations.

628. The UK would take the decision on the timing for bringing the UN process

to an end on 17 March.

629. President Bush was trying to help Mr Blair achieve a majority for military

action in the Parliamentary Labour Party before the House of Commons vote

on 18 March.

630. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 15 March, he thanked him for the

announcement on the MEPP.216

631. Mr Blair said that the main message for the Azores Summit should be that this

was a final chance for the UN to deliver, and that countries should be able to sanction

the use of force as Iraq was in material breach. They discussed the positions of various

countries and Mr Blair underlined the importance of appearing as reasonable as possible

when we pulled the UN resolution. The timing of that decision would be for the UK.

632. Mr Blair and President Bush also discussed the role of the UN post-conflict, the

need to have a post-conflict strategy to deal with the opponents of military action, and

the consequences of the experience on Iraq for the UN in the longer term.

633. Mr Blair’s attempts to agree the role of the UN post-conflict with the US are

addressed in Section 6.5.

634. In his diaries, Mr Campbell provided a long account of the conversation, including:

“He [President Bush] accepted that we had done the right thing on the Road Map.

‘Good advice and it has helped a lot.’ …

215 Private hearing, 26 May 2010, page 30.

216 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq and Middle East: Prime Minister’s Telephone

Conversation with President Bush, 15 March’.

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