The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
answer to
the question of where the primary responsibility for identifying
capability gaps
lay during
Op TELIC. That is unacceptable. The roles and responsibilities for
identifying
and
articulating capability gaps in enduring operations must be clearly
defined,
communicated
and understood by those concerned. It is possible that this has
been
addressed
after the period covered by this Inquiry.
899.
Those
responsible for making decisions on the investment in military
capabilities
should
continually evaluate whether the balance between current
operational
requirements
and long‑term defence programmes is right, particularly to meet
an
evolving
threat on current operations.
900.
During the
first four years of Op TELIC, there was no clear statement of
policy
setting out
the acceptable level of risk to UK forces and who was responsible
for
managing
that risk. The MOD has suggested to the Inquiry that successive
policies
defining
risk ownership and governance more clearly have addressed that
absence,
and that
wider MOD risk management processes have also been revised. In any
future
operation
the level of force protection required to meet the assessed threat
needs to be
addressed
explicitly.
901.
The Inquiry
recognises that, since 2003, significant changes have been made
to
the UK’s
strategic and operational approach to reconstruction and
stabilisation. Some
of those
changes, including the establishment of a deployable UK civilian
stand‑by
capability,
are the direct result of lessons learned from serious shortcomings
in the
deployment
of civilian personnel in post‑conflict Iraq.
902.
The
effectiveness of the UK civilian effort in post‑conflict Iraq was
compromised
by a
range of factors, including the absence of effective
cross‑government co‑ordination
on risk,
duty of care and the terms and conditions applicable to personnel
serving
in Iraq.
903.
The difficult
working conditions for civilians in Iraq were reflected in
short
tour
lengths and frequent leave breaks. Different departments adopted
different
arrangements
throughout the Iraq campaign, leading to concerns about
breaks
in
continuity, loss of momentum, lack of institutional memory and
insufficient local
knowledge.
904.
Different
departments will continue to deploy civilian staff in different
roles.
Standardisation
of all aspects of those deployments may not be appropriate, but
greater
harmonisation
of departmental policies should be considered wherever
possible.
The same
approach should be applied to locally engaged (LE)
staff.
905.
At all stages,
including planning, departments must give full consideration to
their
responsibilities
and duty of care towards LE staff, who have an essential
contribution to
make and
will face particular risks in insecure environments.
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