14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
1156.
Lt Gen Shirreff
said that the Americans had those capabilities, as did the
UK,
but the
UK did not have them in MND(SE).
1157.
On 8 February,
Lt Gen Houghton provided ACM Stirrup with an Op TELIC
force
protection
assessment.609
1158.
Lt Gen Houghton
asked ACM Stirrup to note that there was a
“presentational
difficulty”
around the move to the COB because it only provided Tiers 1 and 2
level
protection,
but that the risk should be viewed “in the context of the aggregate
threat”.
That threat
included IDF, surface‑to‑air missiles, IEDs, direct fire and the
ability of the
enemy to
gain information about UK vulnerabilities. The move to BAS would
lead to
a “safer
overall force posture” because UK forces would “become less exposed
to the
most
effective means of attack”, IEDs, and would allow a concentration
of resources
to ameliorate
risk.
1159.
Lt Gen Houghton
wrote that the “most likely” way insurgents would
disrupt
operations
from the COB was through IDF. The frequency of attacks was
increasing
and the
likelihood of a successful attack had “increased to an estimated 95
percent
probability
within the next three months”.
1160.
Lt Gen Houghton
suggested that the most effective ways of reducing the
potential
scale of a successful IDF attack was through physical
compartmentalisation
of communal
areas, and procedures to limit the number of people in “any given
area”.
Existing
construction work would conclude in June, but “only a move to
suitable
protected
structures” would offer “a notably higher level of
protection”.
1161.
The priority
was for Tier 3 infrastructure in communal areas:
“… we have
decided in principle to provide hardened dining facilities
(estimated at
$14m and 20
months to complete) and to begin expansion of our Tier 3
footprint
(current
estimate additional $60‑70m and an additional 10 months) … We
should
now form a
judgement on the cost/benefit of proceeding with a more extensive
Tier 3
build in
the context of our enduring Overwatch posture.”
1162.
The use of
C‑RAM promised (subject to proof of capability trials) to provide
“a
significant
enhancement” to force protection, although there would be some
integration
issues to
overcome.
1163.
Lt Gen Houghton
continued:
“We are not
fully confident the requirement for increased persistency of
ISTAR
coverage
around the COB and over Basra City can be achieved. The
UOR
programme
to deliver TUAV [Tactical UAV] is on track to deliver an ISD of
July
2007,
although the funded provision may not fully meet our original
statement
of requirement
…”
609
Minute CJO
to PSO/CDS, 8 February 2007, ‘OP TELIC – Force Protection (FP)
Assessment’.
197