3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
12.
Reporting a
conversation with Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s
National
Security
Advisor, at a reception given by President Bush on 12 September,
Mr Straw
wrote that
he had rehearsed his concerns about a two resolution strategy, “not
least
because it
was being pushed … by those who wanted a veto on military action
and
who wanted
to avoid hard choices”.5
They had
also discussed the possibility of seeking
an Iraqi
“declaration” of its WMD programmes. While that might create
“something to
do” while
UNMOVIC got its teams into place, Mr Straw had said he thought
it could be
a “very
dangerous proposal”. Saddam Hussein “would be very likely to
respond with
a massively
detailed document to split the five Permanent Members of the
Security
Council
(the P5) and international public opinion and buy more
time”.
13.
Following his
discussions in New York and in preparation for a meeting with
Mr Blair
on 17
September, Mr Straw sent a minute to Mr Blair setting out
a proposed strategy for
“achieving
our objectives through the UN”.6
14.
Summarising
his views, Mr Straw advised that the UK should:
“•
deliver a
more intrusive inspection regime which, if Saddam complies,
achieves
our WMD
objectives;
•
demand
Iraqi actions not words, within tight deadlines;
•
get all we
need into a first resolution, without either committing
ourselves
[to] or ruling
out a second [resolution];
•
persuade
President Bush to commit to the heavy lifting necessary to
secure
Russian
acquiescence, while we take the lead with the French;
•
be prepared
to run the resolution ourselves if the US agree, since we are
better
placed to
deliver in the Security Council.”
15.
Mr Straw
wrote that President Bush’s speech on 12 September had
“transformed
the
politics of the issue, at least in the short term”, which “gives us
a huge opportunity”.
He added
that achieving the objectives would be a “highly complex process”
which
would
require Mr Blair’s intervention at “crucial moments”, and
that:
“US views
will carry a lot of weight. But as on many issues, they will need
our advice
and
tactical judgement to get what they need out of the Security
Council.”
16.
Mr Straw
reported that he had been assured that President Bush was
“serious
about
trying intrusive inspections as a means to achieve Iraqi WMD
disarmament”.
There were,
however, differences of view within the US Administration.
Mr Straw was
concerned
that there were voices suggesting that any resolution should be
loaded “with
impossible
demands to ensure the inspectors never get deployed, and to create
the
earliest
pretext for military action”.
5
Letter
Straw to Manning, 13 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
6
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 14 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Pursuing the UN
Route’.
203